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INTRODUCTION
Rules are rules -but some rules are made to be broken.
Modern jurisprudence distinguishes mandatory rules from default
rules.' We style as mandatory those rules that legal actors are obliged
to obey, irrespective of their wishes upon the matter. These comprise
rules in the lay understanding of the word. Default rules, on the other
hand, are freely breakable, applying only to a legal actor who forbears
to take whatever steps the law requires to override them. These rules
operate in the breach, announcing themselves when legal actors are
silent, and filling in the lacunae in their arrangements with others.
This categorical dichotomy (if a trifle oversimplified)2 is well known
within contract law, where parties to a commercial transaction or
business agreement can draft around any default rule contrary to their
liking. The same dichotomy reappears within the inheritance field.
Of course, several of the most prominent inheritance doctrines are
mandatory ones: The statute of wills and the rule against perpetuities,
for instance, establish guidelines that benefactors cannot choose to
abrogate at their pleasure. At the same time, other inheritance
doctrines-the bulk of them, in fact-comprise default rules.3  The
most fundamental of these is the intestacy statute, setting out rules for
the division of decedents' estates that take effect in the absence of,
and yield to, an executed writing. The intestacy scheme represents
1. Although the distinction has roots within the work of earlier theorists, its
nomenclature and currency (primarily within the literature of law and economics)
dates to the past twenty years or so. See Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract
Scholarship, 112 Yale L.J. 881, 885-86 (2003). Some variation in nomenclature
lingers: Scholars use the term "immutable" rules on occasion as a synonym for
mandatory rules. E.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis,
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1269 (2003).
2. One could further distinguish intentional from accidental default rules, the
latter comprising rules that lawmakers intend to make mandatory but which
nonetheless prove to be default rules because imperfections of design have left them
with a "loophole." What is more, a borderland exists between mandatory and default
rules: for the obstacles in the path of a party who wishes to override a default rule
may be considerable, hence difficult and/or expensive to clear. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. ch.
737.402(4)(a) (2003) (requiring a party who wishes to override the rule at issue to
"refer specifically to this subsection and provide expressly to the contrary"); In re
Estate of Robbins, 756 A.2d 602, 604 (N.H. 2000) (ruling that language apparently
intended to override a default rule was insufficiently precise to do so). Professor
Ayres dubs default rules within this borderland "strong defaults." Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 123 (1989).
3. This fact reflects the great scope of freedom of testation under American law.
For a recognition of the structural dominance of default rules within the realm of trust
law, see John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1105, 1105 (2004). Default rules are also quite venerable and even numbered among
the inheritance doctrines laid down in the earliest known lex scripta. See The
Hammurabi Code § 171a, at 61 (Chilperic Edwards ed., 3d ed. 1921) (c. 2084-2081
B.C.) (legal code of Babylonia) ("And if the father in his lifetime has not said .... ").
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"the will which the law makes,"4 if and only if the decedent fails to
make her own.5
However predominant, the default rules of inheritance law have
received less scholarly attention than have their mandatory
counterparts. Without exception, extant discussions of inheritance
defaults have confined themselves to particular doctrines; thus far, no
one has assayed the problem as a conceptual whole. Possibly as a
consequence, scholarship on inheritance law has largely neglected to
explore, or even to notice, the potential relevance of general default
rule theory, even while that theory has flourished within the province
of contract law.6
My agenda in this Article is twofold: namely, to make a
contribution both to the theoretical content and context of inheritance
defaults. My overall conclusion is that contractual default rule theory
provides a model that is readily adaptable to inheritance defaults and
points the way to their ideal composition.
Laying down a policy foundation for inheritance defaults comprises
the main task, which we undertake in Part I. Then, in Part II, we
commence to build upon that foundation by addressing how
lawmakers might apply a theory of inheritance defaults to rework a
number of prevalent rules, with particular attention to their
formulation under the influential Uniform Probate Code ("the
Code")-for it is one thing to instill a theory, and another to install it
on the ground. Finally, in the Conclusion, we step back and reflect
upon the larger implications of the analysis.
I. INHERITANCE DEFAULTS IN THEORY
A. Prior Examinations
The first thing to do is briefly to rehearse what others have
conjectured about the subject. Although scholars heretofore have
4. Peter Lovelass, The Will Which Makes the Law (London, W. Strahan & M.
Woodfall 1785) (retitled The Law's Disposal of a Person's Estate Who Dies Without
Will or Testament in subsequent editions).
5. Additional default rules fill gaps or clarify ambiguities within wills while
yielding to the act of more detailed testation. The doctrines of lapse and ademption,
for instance, fall into this category.
6. Several scholars have made reference to general default rule theory in
connection with a few discrete inheritance problems. See Joel C. Dobris, The Probate
World at the End of the Century: Is a New Principal and Income Act in Your Future?,
28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 393, 397-409 (1993); Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat
Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 257, 276-79
(1994). In the context of trust law, see Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising:
The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 109, 148-49
(2001); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J.
625, 660-64 (1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
Cornell L. Rev. 621,644-46 (2004).
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developed no general theories of inheritance defaults, individual
default rules have of course come under scrutiny. Examination of
those discussions, most prolific in connection with intestacy law,
reveals the absence of any clear, developed framework of analysis. In
setting guidelines for state legislators drafting rules for distribution of
estates in the absence of a will, commentators have typically cited to
multiple criteria. Writing early in the twentieth century, Thomas
Atkinson identified "two primary considerations" for determining
rules of intestate succession: provision for dependents of the decedent
and provision for those whom "an average property owner would be
most apt to favor."7 Professor Atkinson defended these dual concerns
succinctly: "The humane basis of the former is evident, while if the
latter ideal is accomplished the number of cases in which a will is
thought desirable will be reduced."8
More recent analyses of intestacy law have been similarly terse, and
similarly eclectic. Mary Lou Fellows and collaborators place
alongside the "dispository wishes" of decedents the "alternative
defensible rationale" of serving society's interests, identified as
protection of dependents, avoidance of complications of title,
promotion of the nuclear family, and encouragement of industry.9
With regard to the decedent's wishes, Professor Fellows opines that
"[t]estamentary freedom should include the right not to have to
execute a will in order to... pass [wealth] to natural objects of the
decedent's bounty," whereas denial of that right would "create[] a
trap for the ignorant or misinformed."" ° To the extent that society's
well-being conflicts with the wishes of intestate decedents, it should
take precedence only where the social interest at stake is of
"overriding" importance."
In subsequent work, Fellows and other scholars have diminished
their emphasis on the intent of the decedent, rarely heralding its
primacy among the litany of goals of intestacy law. 2 At the same
7. Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 187
(1935).
8. Id. at 187-88.
9. Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death
and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 321,
323-24.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 324.
12. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner et al., Family Property Law 37-38 (3d ed.
2002) (laying out a string of considerations without further comment); Lawrence H.
Averill, Jr., & Hon. Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison of Arkansas's Current Law
Concerning Succession, Wills, and Other Donative Transfers with Article II of the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 631, 639-40 & n.35 (1995)
(same); Mary L. Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 Law & Ineq. 1, 8-9, 12-13 (1998) (same); Mary L. Fellows, Concealing
Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The Advancements Doctrine and
the Uniform Probate Code, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 671, 674 n.8 (1984) (suggesting that "to
the extent ... societal interests [in intestate succession] conflict with the preferences
[Vol. 731034
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time, they have added to that litany. Inheritance scholars now posit
that intestacy law can take on an "expressive" function. Applying
ideas first developed in the abstract by Cass Sunstein and others, 3
these scholars suggest framing the default regime of intestacy law with
an eye toward the inculcation of social norms that lawmakers deem
desirable-both generally within the community-at-large, and
specifically among benefactors who do execute wills:
The law has great potential to teach and reinforce the values that
ground it or appear to ground it. Those who experience the law
operating upon them personally and those who observe the law
operating on others are likely to learn whom the law respects,
ignores, privileges, and disadvantages.
In this way, intestacy law not only reflects society's familial norms
but also helps to shape and maintain them.'
4
Finally, inheritance scholars now assert that, along with all of this,
lawmakers formulating intestacy laws should also take into account
the pattern of distribution that survivors would consider fair. Doing
so will promote family harmony and respect for the legal system while
of individual citizens, the societal interests should prevail"); Julian R. Kossow, The
New York Law of Intestate Succession Compared with the Uniform Probate Code:
Where There's No Will There's a Way, 4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 233, 238-39 (1976) (urging
lawmakers to focus on "society's interest"); Eugene F. Scoles, Probate Reform, in
Death, Taxes and Family Property 136, 149-51 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977)
(suggesting that "justice and fairness for the successors" along with "due
consideration" of intent inspire intestacy law); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-
Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81
Or. L. Rev. 255, 289 (2002) (suggesting that various goals of intestacy law ought to be
"balance[d]"); see also id. at 269-89. But cf. Ralph C. Brashier, Inheritance Law and
the Evolving Family 4, 7 (2004) ("the first goal" of intestacy law is to effectuate the
typical decedent's intent, but "[like all laws, probate laws ultimately should promote
and protect the state"); Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, Problems in Probate Law,
Including a Model Probate Code § 22 cmt. (1946) ("[I]ntestate succession.., should
in the main express what the typical intestate would have wished." (emphasis added))
[hereinafter Model Probate Code]; William Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession
Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037, 1047 (1966) (endorsing only the goal of intent
effectuation). For additional surveys of the prevailing eclecticism of intestacy theory,
see Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. 1,
7-13 (2000) [hereinafter Gary, Adapting Intestacy]; Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child
Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 643, 651-53 (2002)
[hereinafter Gary, Parent-Child].
13. See infra Part I.C.2.d.
14. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of
Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 1063, 1100 (1999); see also id. at 1099-1102.
Likewise, Professor Fellows and collaborators observed:
At the same time that intestacy statutes reflect social norms and values, they
also shape the norms and values by recognizing and legitimating
relationships....
By including a surviving committed partner as an heir, the intestacy scheme
would... establish a social norm that a partner should have a share in a
decedent's estate.
Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 8, 22; see also id. at 8-10, 90-91.
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serving to protect survivors' reliance and reciprocity interests in
decedents' estates. 15
The Commissioners who drafted the Uniform Probate Code have
been tight-lipped about their perspective on intestacy policy.
Whereas a general comment accompanying the original version of the
Code stated that its intestacy provisions "attempt[] to reflect the
normal desire of the owner.., as to [the] disposition of his property at
death," 16 the revised version (significantly?) omits this passage,
adverting more obliquely to "bringing [intestacy law] into line with
developing public policy,"' 7 without elaborating what that might be.
In independent work, however, the Reporter for the revised Code
endorses an eclectic approach to fashioning intestacy law. 8 Likewise,
when called upon to interpret existing intestacy statutes in light of
their purposes, at least some courts have assumed those purposes to
include the accomplishment of "[s]tate interests" along with the
observance of donative intent. 19
It would seem, then, that intestacy law-the quintessential default
rule in the inheritance field-has become a theoretical grab-bag.
Scholars and lawmakers are now prepared to acknowledge the
relevance of virtually every conceivable preference- that of the
decedent, that of survivors, that of society-all mixed together in no
particular order and following no unified formula. Commentary
associated with other inheritance defaults is similar in character.2 °
15. Waggoner et al., supra note 12, at 38; Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 12; Gary,
Adapting Intestacy, supra note 12, at 10-11; Gary, Parent-Child, supra note 12, at 652-
53; Spitko, supra note 12, at 269-83.
16. Unif. Probate Code art. I1, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2003), 8 U.L.A. 271 (1998)
(pre-1990 version of article II).
17. Id. art. II, pt. 1, general cmt. (amended 2003).
18. The Reporter in question is Professor Lawrence Waggoner. See Waggoner et
al., supra note 12, at 37-38.
19. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264-65 (Mass. 2002); see
also Nunnally v. Trust Co. Bank, 261 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Ga. 1979); Estate of Hicks,
675 N.E.2d 89, 93-94 (111. 1996); cf. Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 594, 599
(Ct. App. 1993) (referring to effectuation of intent as the "principal purpose" of
intestacy law); King v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 793, 795 (Va. 1980) (same); King v.
Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983) (referring only to the goal of effectuating
probable intent, without indicating whether that goal is exclusive); In re Estate of
Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000) (same). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 775 n.16 (1977) ("doubt[ing]" the constitutionality of an intestacy statute that
implements a discriminatory probable intent "[alt least when the disadvantaged group
has been a frequent target of discrimination"); MacCallum v. Seymour, 686 A.2d 935,
938-41 (Vt. 1996) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection an
intestacy statute purporting to follow presumed discriminatory intent toward adopted
children).
20. The doctrine of lapse (and antilapse), for example, applying a default rule to
redirect bequests made to beneficiaries who cannot inherit because they predecease
the benefactor, came to be considered an intent-effectuating doctrine only in the
nineteenth century. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 Ohio St.
L.J. 1057, 1128-29 (1996). Yet, the Commissioners also speak of the doctrine as
"remedial in nature, tending to preserve equality of treatment among different lines
DEFAULT RULES IN INHERITANCE LAW
This won't do-or, at least, it fails meaningfully to clarify how
lawmakers ought to go about setting the rules of intestacy or other
inheritance defaults. Any theory so chock-full of ideas is, in practical
consequence, evacuated of content. Like those sprawling, five-part
balancing tests that often ornament constitutional law, the theory has
grown so luxuriant that it now serves to justify nothing-or anything
at all.
B. Parallel Examinations
There matters stand, none too happily, in the inheritance realm. In
the contractual realm, on the other hand, default rule theory has
matured, pari passu, into a sharper tool of policy analysis.
Contractual theorists posit that the sole purpose of default rules is
to promote efficiency by minimizing transaction costs. Hence, default
rules are necessary only because transaction costs exist. If Adam and
Eve had bargained in a Coasian Eden where transacting was costless,
they would have provided ex ante in their contracts for every
eventuality. Default rules would have served no purpose in their
perfect world.2 In our own imperfect world, however, bargaining
parties have to bear transaction costs that inevitably give rise to
incomplete agreements.22 Contractual theorists contend that when
parties fail to spell out provisions in a contract or other instrument of
agreement, the law should supply the missing terms by reference to
the hypothetical bargain that parties most likely would have arrived at
themselves had they addressed the issue. This approach is efficient in
that it spares those pairs of parties who are pleased with the default
rules the expense of drafting the missing terms-including provisions
for the myriad of imaginable contingencies that might never come to
pass. Of course, parties who disfavor the rules will still have to incur
costs to opt out of the default regime, but so long as each default rule
of succession." Unif. Probate Code § 2-603 cmt. (amended 2003). The default rule of
ademption, reformulating bequests of property that no longer exists at the
benefactor's death, has rarely been framed in intent-effectuating terms at all. Hirsch,
supra, at 1128-35; see also Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older
and Better, or More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 640-41
(1993) (downplaying the importance of intent effectuation in comparison to
"simplicity and certainty").
21. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 737-42 (1992) (addressing the
implications of the Coase Theorem for default rules); Larry T. Garvin,
Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and
Cognitive Reality, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 339, 366-67 (1998) (same); Alan Schwartz, The
Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 389,
397-99 (1993) (same).
22. See generally Sharon Gifford, Limited Attention and the Optimal
Incompleteness of Contracts, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 468 (1999).
20041 1037
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
selected by lawmakers constitutes a majoritarian default, transaction
costs are reduced in the aggregate.23
This classical, economic approach to default rules has never quite
attained the status of dogma; other theorists have weighed in with
criticisms. One difficulty identified in the modern literature is how to
go about determining in a realistic way what parties to a contract
would have agreed to, given surplus value and a mutual desire to
maximize profit. Because "any number of distributions of rights and
responsibilities.., would be jointly profit maximizing," determining
the parties' hypothetical bargain "is no trivial undertaking."24
Ian Ayres offers a more fundamental criticism. In a much-cited
brace of articles,25 he and a collaborator argue that lawmakers
sometimes achieve greater efficiency by setting default rules designed
to contradict the parties' preferences. Seemingly perverse, a so-called
"penalty" default can operate benignly, either to create incentives for
better informed parties to reveal information to the less well
informed, or to create incentives to reveal information to "third
parties (especially the courts)," thereby avoiding ex post litigation
which is state-subsidized and hence an inefficient means of eliciting
information.26
C. Cross-Examination
Gratuitous transfers and commercial transactions have developed
into separate bodies of law, surrounded by separate nebulae of
theory-including, as we have just seen, separate spheres of default
rule theory. Nevertheless, both involve voluntary arrangements
operating to shift resources between individuals. The foundational
claim of this Article is that contract scholars have something to teach
inheritance scholars (and perhaps vice versa?) about the problem of
default rules.
23. E.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 200-04 (3d ed.
2000); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 4.1, at 96-97, § 14.3, at 413
(6th ed. 2003). This approach constitutes "[t]he received wisdom of a vast law-and-
economics literature." Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of
Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 5 (1993). For a case putting this theory
into practice, see Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588,
596 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).
24. Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions
and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 707-09 passim
(1989); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 21, at 765-66 passim (demonstrating that
"[wihen the parties' knowledge is not symmetric,.., choosing the efficient [default]
rule can entail an extraordinarily complex analysis").
25. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 21.
26. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91. Hence, the term "information forcing"
default is sometimes used in place of the older sobriquet "penalty" default. For a
related criticism by Ayres of the theory of majoritarian defaults, see infra text
accompanying note 148.
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1. Majoritarian Defaults
For contractual theorists, default rules serve to minimize the
expense of bargaining. Gratuitous transfers do not ordinarily involve
bargaining, to be exact, but they do entail drafting and formalization,
in the form of a will. By analogy to the two-party "hypothetical
bargain" approach to default rules on the contracts side, we can posit
a one-party "probable intent" approach to default rules on the
inheritance side.27
Begin with the limiting case. If a default rule of intestacy correctly
anticipates a benefactor's distributive preferences, both initially and as
her circumstances change, lawmakers save her the expense of
executing a will altogether. The scale of the saving is bound to fall
short of its equivalent on the contracts side-since business
negotiations typically cost more than estate planning-but
nevertheless comprises an efficiency.28 In this respect, the contractual
model fits gratuitous transfers snugly.
When we turn to the problem of default rules applicable to filling
gaps within an executed will, however, the issue becomes more
nuanced. Although a theorist might conjecture that default rules can
function to reduce the marginal cost of preparing a will by removing
the need to spell out contingencies, a competent practitioner in the
field would scoff at that idea. It is a credo of estate planning that a
well-drafted will should anticipate contingencies and never rely on
default rules. 29 There are several explanations for this drafting policy,
27. "A will is a unilateral instrument, and the court is concerned only with the
intention of the testator as expressed in the document." Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d
3, 7 (Tex. 1971).
28. For an observation of the potential efficiency of intestacy law in rendering will
execution unnecessary, thereby avoiding "time and expense," see Estate of Cleveland,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 599 (Ct. App. 1993). Cf William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F.
Kurtz, Wills, Trusts, and Estates § 2.3, at 61-62 (3d ed. 2004) (suggesting that wills are
potentially more efficient than intestacy in that they allow benefactors to name
executors and to modify their powers-although these too are subjects of default
rules in intestacy). For modern trends in estate planning costs, see David J. McCabe
& Dilip B. Patel, Is Estate Planning Expensive?, Tr. & Est., June 2004, at 60. For
empirical evidence that some benefactors forebear to execute wills because they are
satisfied with the distributive outcome under intestacy law, see Marvin B. Sussman et
al., The Family and Inheritance 72, 202 (1970); and Contemporary Studies Project, A
Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selective Provisions of the Iowa
and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1041, 1076-78 (1978). But cf. Gerry W.
Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms- The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and
Empirical Findings, 72 Or. L. Rev. 769, 842 (1993); Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 339;
see also infra note 131. Conversely, for empirical evidence that some benefactors
execute wills because they are dissatisfied with the outcome under intestacy law, see
infra note 48.
29. John R. Price, Price on Contemporary Estate Planning §§ 4.15.1-.2 (2d ed.
2000); David M. Becker, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-707 and the Experienced
Estate Planner: Unexpected Disasters and How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA L. Rev.
339, 406 (1999); Nancy G. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in Wills (pt. 1),
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which highlight differences between the gratuitous and contractual
spheres. First, once a benefactor engages an attorney to draft a will,
that attorney must go to the trouble of establishing intent in any
event; thereafter, the difference in cost between resolving
contingencies explicitly or implicitly is insignificant. Again, no costly
negotiations are involved. And second, the potentially long latency
period before a will matures, coupled with the possibility that the
benefactor will migrate to a different jurisdiction in the interim, raises
the prospect that the original default rule upon which a drafter relied
may not in due course govern the testamentary instrument.3" No
equivalent danger menaces parties in the contractual realm.
Nevertheless, the contractual model remains germane in connection
with poorly drafted wills. If, because of imperfect drafting, a will
neglects to anticipate a significant contingency which then occurs, a
default rule reflecting the benefactor's intent as modified by unfolding
events spares her the expense of executing a codicil. That again
represents a cost efficiency.
To be sure, heterogeneous preferences may dilute the potential
gains in efficiency available in the inheritance realm. Donative intent
varies widely: No will has a brother, is another of the estate planner's
abiding maxims. It follows that the wider the variety of alternative
preferences that a default rule must anticipate, the fewer the number
of parties who can take advantage of it to save transaction costs.
"Plurality defaults" afford less savings than "majoritarian defaults,"
and many inheritance defaults will fall into the first category, not the
second.31 Yet the same may be true of contractual defaults, and,
however varied preferences become, the potential for efficiency never
vanishes completely.
Simultaneously, contractual default rule theory affirmatively gains
credibility in at least one respect when introduced into the inheritance
realm. One of the modern criticisms of contractual theory, we have
43 Prac. Law. 33, 39, 47-48 (1997); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate
Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 Mich. L. Rev.
2309, 2310-12 (1996).
30. Price, supra note 29, § 4.15.1. Well-drafted wills can minimize this hazard by
including governing-law clauses, although their effectiveness under state law would
remain uncertain. See 1 Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Multistate and Multinational Estate
Planning § 14.08.D (2d ed. 1999); Henderson, supra note 29, at 34-35.
31. The possibility of a plurality default has also been hypothesized within
contractual theory, although its efficiency implications have gone unexplored therein.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L.
Rev. 1591, 1612 (1999) ("[B]ecause of heterogeneity, a majoritarian default may not
even exist-there may only be a plurality default."). One inheritance scholar
understood the problem intuitively: "When neither spouse nor issue survives, there
appears to be too little regularity in the patterns of testamentary succession to justify
their use as a frame of reference for intestate succession." Olin L. Browder, Jr.,
Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 Mich. L.
Rev. 1303, 1312 (1969).
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observed, is the difficulty of anticipating the terms that competing
bargainers would likely agree on if unimpeded by transaction costs,
for there exist any number of mutually beneficial equilibria.32 This
problem disappears when we re-direct the theory to a one-party
model.33 In this context, the preferences that default rules are
supposed to parrot are less "hypothetical" (although the means of
going about discovering them still require analysis).34
Yet, in one other respect, contractual theory may not travel quite so
well. In order to exploit default rules to save transaction costs, parties
need first to glean what the default rules are. As always, this
knowledge costs something to obtain. By hypothesis, if the
information cost ever exceeds the transaction cost, then default rule
theory breaks down. From the perspective of professional
merchants and corporate entities, who are ordinarily repeat players,
the benefits of streamlining the contractual process again and again
should outweigh any initial investment in the knowledge of default
rules necessary to facilitate such streamlining.36 On the other hand,
benefactors-mortals who, as such, can only die once-may see the
matter differently. For a one-time gratuitous transfer, the burdens of
deciphering legal texts that comprise an essential precursor to
capitalizing on default rules loom larger, since the information cost is
more difficult to amortize. The fog of law thus hangs heavier over this
segment of the legal landscape.37
Does this mean that relatively few benefactors could make efficient
use of majoritarian defaults? On reflection, we may conclude that the
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. But cf. Gregory S. Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than
Collective Choice?, 7 Econ. & Phil. 143 (1991).
34. See infra Part I.D.2.
35. For a related condition under which default rule theory breaks down, see infra
note 51 and accompanying text. In connection with the instant scenario, if it is less
costly to formalize one's preference than to learn what the default rule is, then
everyone who values the preference more than the transaction cost will bear the cost
to formalize the preference. The rest are not relying on a default rule they do not
know (since the information cost is even higher), so setting a majoritarian default
saves no transaction costs. Under these conditions, lawmakers may as well set default
rules to accomplish social purposes.
36. Perhaps because of this implicit fact, inquiries into the information cost
problem have been few. See Ayres, supra note 23, at 10-11 ("Complex default rules
might induce more complete contracting because it is comparatively less costly to
write comprehensive provisions than it is to become informed of the complex rule.");
Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
Va. L. Rev. 821, 886-87 (1992) ("With small one-shot transactions it may be irrational
for either party to pay a lawyer to provide information concerning the default rules.");
Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 115, 136 (1993) ("Especially if they are to find it easy to contract
out, parties should be able to know the applicable default rule with ease.").
37. To adapt a famous metaphor for the informational opaqueness of the




theory remains viable. It bears noting initially that although
benefactors only die once, they may nevertheless contemplate their
estate plans more than once. Personal circumstances often evolve,
and an estate plan remains ambulatory, subject to revision at will. In
this sense, benefactors can be repeat players, and a calculating one
might deem an initial investment in legal information to pay dividends
over time.
If, however, most benefactors judge the acquisition of legal
information as cost inefficient, that fact would support an indictment
not of the state of our theory, but of the state of our law. Presented
with the indictment, lawmakers ought to respond by simplifying
inheritance defaults-and to go on doing so until they reach a point
where a majority could, after all, make sense of them without first
having to incur exorbitant expense.38 Viewed structurally, reliance is
just as feasible in the world of gratuity as in the busier world of
commerce, although the facilitation of reliance requires sensitivity to
the different characteristics of those two worlds.
Indeed, the core insight of contractual theory is not alien to the
thinking of inheritance scholars. It may even have found its earliest
expression there. Professor Atkinson anticipated the idea seventy
years ago (less the decorations of modern jargon) when he observed
that by patterning the default rules of intestacy after the "average"
decedent's intent "the number of cases in which a will is thought
desirable will be reduced."39 Still, this notion is just one element in
the farrago of ideas that has poured forth from inheritance scholars
over the years. What of the rest of it?
2. Social Defaults
a. Inheritance Theory
Considered as a matter of inheritance theory, the introduction of an
eclectic mix of considerations into intestacy law or other inheritance
defaults appears anomalous on its face. When it comes to the
interpretation of testamentary texts, the principle that applies is clear,
unchallenged, and perdurable: In the language of judicial metaphor,
the intent of the testator is "the pole-star by which the courts must
steer."4 Yet, with regard to the interpretation of silence, to be filled
by the pronouncements of lawmakers, inheritance scholars would
38. For a more detailed discussion of the optimal complexity of inheritance
defaults, see infra Part I.D.l.b.
39. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 187-88; see also Browder, supra note 31, at 1313.
40. 4 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 537 (photo. reprint 1971)
(1826-1830). Chancellor Kent coined the phrase, although the idea it embodies dates
to medieval times, if not earlier. For further references, including citations to modem
caselaw, see Hirsch, supra note 20, at 1114-15 nn.170-72.
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have us navigate by a larger constellation of stars. What justifies
distinguishing the two situations?
Inheritance scholars have not faced up to this question. Susan Gary
observes that social considerations usually "parallel" probable intent,
thereby avoiding a conflict,4' but to that extent social considerations
merely become superfluous. The problem remains: What about those
situations where the two fail to correspond?
One conceivable response is that the public policy of intent-
oriented construction-as a concomitant of freedom of testation in
general-reaches no farther than the creation of an opportunity to
express donative wishes. Once a benefactor has forsaken that
opportunity, the state ought to impose whatever disposition it deems
expedient.42 Is such a proposition defensible within inheritance
theory? The matter requires us to go back a step and review the
policies testamentary freedom is supposed to subserve.
One traditional justification for freedom of testation is that it
encourages benefactors to produce and save more wealth. If an
individual knows that the power of disposition at death (the jus
dividendi) is included among the incidents of ownership, then the
value of property to its owner increases-hence strengthening her
incentive to produce it. A second longstanding rationale for freedom
of testation is that it facilitates a gray economy in the provision of
social services within a family, where formal exchange would be
hampered by cultural taboos. Those taboos do not, however,
foreclose exercises in reciprocal altruism; parents can obtain benefits
during life in return for gifts at death. Finally, freedom of testation
exploits benefactors' detailed knowledge of their families to make
sensible provisions for them and hence to enhance their welfare.
Courts could set about this task themselves but only at much greater
information and administrative cost.
43
None of these conventional rationales justifies intent-effectuation in
connection with default rules. All pertain exclusively to active estate
planning. Thus, the added incentive to productivity flows from the
opportunity to execute a will, as does the market in social services.
41. Gary, Adapting Intestacy, supra note 12, at 10.
42. See Ascher, supra note 20, at 641 ("I am less interested in a system that seeks
to carry out a decedent's intent (particularly where the decedent has never bothered
to express that intent) .... ). But cf supra note 10 and accompanying text. Compare
the early jurisprudential assertion that intent effectuation for intestate decedents
should accompany freedom of testation because they form dual aspects of the natural
right of ownership. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres bk. II, ch. 7, pt. iii
(Francis W. Kelsey et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1925) (1646); Samuel Pufendorf, De
Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo 625 (C. H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans.,
Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 38, 44 (R.L.
Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1762-1763).
43. For an elaboration of the rationales adumbrated in this paragraph, together
with scholarly references, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992).
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And in order for lawmakers to exploit benefactors' detailed
knowledge, they must proceed affirmatively to record their estate
plans; when they fail to do so, an effort to restore the lost benefit
would defeat the purpose of avoiding information and administrative
costs.
b. Default Rule Theory
Nevertheless, if we reflect anew upon the issue in light of
contractual default rule theory, this analysis appears problematic.
Apart from effectuation of probable intent, all of the public policy
objectives of intestacy law identified by inheritance scholars involve
potential benefits to society in respect of fairness or tangible social
welfare. The ideal response under these conditions, well known in
economics, is a Pigouvian tax (or subsidy) operating either to charge
benefactors for negative externalities or to reward them for positive
externalities produced by alternative distributive choices." Once
preferences adjust in reaction to the tax, we again maximize total
wealth by minimizing transaction costs-that is, by applying a
majoritarian default.
Yet, even assuming (as we shall do for the balance of the
discussion) that lawmakers are politically constrained from a tax-
related response to externalities, default rules set by reference to
societal interests-which we shall dub social defaults45-cannot
operate as an alternative means of social regulation. Social defaults
that conflict with intent simply force parties46 to bear the cost of
contracting around the less preferred rule, a dead-weight loss that
reduces efficiency.47 Indeed, by placing more than a minimum
number of parties in this predicament, and hence contributing to the
needless waste of resources, social defaults are open to criticism on
moral grounds: "[E]nacted to bring about fair or just states," these
rules are "actually ... unfair" for rules that "[i]ncreas[e] costs without
increasing gains [are] unfair to the burdened parties. '4 This analysis
readily crosses over from contracts to gratuitous transfers. A social
44. A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 192-94 (photo reprint, 4th ed. 1952)
(1932); see, e.g., Nicolas Wallart, The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes 25-
56 (1999). To a limited extent, such taxes and subsidies exist under current law: In
some jurisdictions, state inheritance taxes increase with the distance of the
relationship between benefactor and beneficiary, thereby encouraging bequests to
close relatives. At the same time, federal law grants an exemption from federal estate
taxes for charitable bequests, thereby encouraging bequests that qualify. Regis W.
Campfield et al., Taxation of Estates, Gifts and Trusts 11-12, 561-62 (1999).
45. Cf Schwartz, supra note 21, at 391 (suggesting different terminology).
46. By which (strictly speaking) we refer hereinafter to pairs of parties in a
contractual model and to individual parties making a transfer at death in a gratuitous
transfers model.
47. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 402.
48. Id.
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default contrary to benefactors' probable intent puts them to the
unnecessary expense of overriding the default by executing a will.49
Still, this simple and straightforward conclusion becomes more
complicated when we delve a little deeper into the assumptions that
underlie it. The proposition that social defaults are futile and wasteful
takes for granted that (virtually) all parties have a sufficient stake in
the rules to contract around them. In that case, a social default simply
results in the fulfillment of the parties' preferences at greater cost than
if the preferred rule were the default rule. The only sensible
alternative to the preferred default rule in that event is a mandatory
rule fulfilling social interests, which would be efficient if the
mandatory rule is more valuable to society in the aggregate than the
preferred rule is to affected parties in the aggregate. 0
On the other hand, if (virtually) all parties find their stake in the
rule to be so small that the transaction cost of opting out exceeds the
benefit of doing so, then lawmakers could impose a social default,
increasing public welfare without wasting any resources. Hence, one
scholar argues that the hypothetical bargain model breaks down in
this context.51 To make the point otherwise: If no one (by hypothesis)
has a sufficient incentive to opt out of a default rule, then it becomes
the functional equivalent of a mandatory rule and should be analyzed
as one. Once again, mandatory (and functionally mandatory) rules
can efficiently impose social preferences over the preferences of
contracting parties when the benefit to society of doing so exceeds the
cost to the parties.
Most interesting of all is the "intermediate" case-possibly a
common one-where a significant fraction of the parties would have a
sufficient interest to opt out of a social default, and a significant
fraction would not. 2 This problem has not, as of yet, been modeled in
49. See Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 205 (finding in one empirical study that a
significant fraction of testators "said they made or would make wills because they
preferred not to have their property distributed in strict accordance with the
intesta[cy] statutes"); Mary L. Fellows et al., An Empirical Study of the Illinois
Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. Ill. L. F. 717, 723 (reporting a similar finding); Monica
K. Johnson & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform the Law of
Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 479,
489-90 (1998) (same).
50. We are simplifying by assuming that the parties' preferred rule generates no
value to society, and vice versa. Otherwise, what we refer to as values would instead
have to be marginal values. See also the related discussion in Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1405-
06 (1989); and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1555-56 (1989).
51. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1879 (1991).
52. The tendency of parties to accede to default rules in order to avoid the cost of
contracting around them renders them "sticky," in Professor Ayres's terminology.
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 31, at 1598. Because transaction costs never reach
absolute zero, every default rule should be at least a trifle sticky-a principle Ayres
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the default rule literature. We present such a model below in
Appendix I.
If some parties would bear transaction costs to avoid a default rule
and others would not, lawmakers have three choices: they can adopt a
mandatory rule imposing the state's preference, a social default rule,
or a default rule consistent with the parties' preferences. Depending
on the values that parties derive from their preference relative to the
value the state assigns to its preference, circumstances will plainly
exist where either a mandatory rule or a preferred default rule
achieves efficiency. But will lawmakers ever maximize total wealth by
adopting a social default?
The answer is yes: It may be intuitively obvious (and can be
demonstrated mathematically) that, very roughly speaking, where the
values different parties derive from their preference vary around a
midpoint that comprises the value the state assigns to its preference,
the opportunity to sort the parties into strong-preferrers (willing to
pay dearly to escape a social default) and weak-preferrers (who would
not lift a finger to do so) maximizes value, even though some
transaction costs are borne in the process.53 Hence, when (and only
when) the necessary conditions are satisfied, social defaults prove
efficient.
c. Moral Theory
Nevertheless, even assuming-and it is a generous assumption-
that lawmakers could ascertain all of these values in the absence of
actual market signals with any meaningful degree of rigor,54 a moral
calls "the iron law of default inertia." Id. For a psychological explanation for the
stickiness of default rules, albeit one that could not apply to inheritance defaults, see
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1269-74.
53. See infra app. I.
54. Professor Eric Kades has, in effect, inferred that intestacy law provides an
opportunity for the sort of value screening just described: Persons "[who] are
working hard to provide someone with an inheritance.., know that they need only
write a will" to avoid the rules of intestacy, whereas when one does die intestate
"there are fairly strong grounds to presume a certain indifference on the part of the
deceased." Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J. 1489, 1553-54 (1999). On this basis,
Professor Kades concludes that an "expansion of escheat"-the rule whereby the
state confiscates an intestate's estate in lieu of close surviving relatives-"seems
efficient." Id. at 1554. Such an expansion would "create[] little, if any, disincentive for
the living" to produce wealth, because the rule would only apply to intestates, whose
wealth is "basically abandoned at death." Id. at 1553; see also Beyer, supra note 28, at
842 (reporting empirical evidence that indifference is a factor in, but not a major
cause of, intestacy); Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1076-78
(reporting empirical evidence of the causes of intestacy; indifference not mentioned
as significant); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 241, 263 (1963) (surmising that persons
without close relatives who fail to execute a will "simply do not care what happens to
their property"). The doctrine of escheat that Kades endorses is, indeed, a social
default, in that it provides wealth to society. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying
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case can still be made for eschewing social defaults, at least in the
province of gratuitous transfers." The case rests on the stratifying
effect of social defaults: Social defaults discriminate against poorer
benefactors. That the effect exists is easy enough to demonstrate.
Why it exists, and why we can anticipate it to persist, requires a brief
digression.
Economic theory predicts that richer and poorer benefactors should
have differential propensities to testation. Affluent benefactors are
better able to bear the transaction cost connected with will-drafting
than those who are straitened. 6 Likewise, affluent benefactors are
better able to bear the higher fees demanded by an experienced
drafter, who is less apt to leave accidental gaps in a will. This much is
obvious. But another less-exploited, although quite significant, theory
reinforces the point. For propensities to testation do not depend
merely on cold assessments of costs and benefits: Psychological
factors are also implicated.
Executing a will can yield obvious psychic benefits: "For the vast
majority of estate planning clients, the main reason for having a
will ... is the peace of mind that comes from knowing that their assets
will be distributed the way they want them to be distributed."57 Yet,
attorneys practicing in the field have long wrung their hands over
many clients' mulish resistance to estate planning.58 Attorneys who
have met this resistance explain it in a variety of ways, and the cost of
their services ranks low on their list.59 Clients often harbor what one
observer calls "the illusion of continued life. The minds of many
simply do not avert to the possibility of untimely death and there
exists the belief that there is no pressing need to attend to the
text. Nevertheless, without far more evidence, we cannot safely assume that
intestates are blasd about the distribution of their estates, and that the expansion of
escheat would not actuate them in large numbers needlessly to bear the costs of
testation.
55. Cf supra text accompanying note 48. Of course, the moral and economic
perspectives on public policy are not mutually exclusive. See generally Daniel M.
Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (1996).
56. The cost increases with the size of the estate but not proportionately with it,
because estate planners typically charge on an hourly basis for the work they perform.
See Mercer D. Tate, Strategies for Establishing a Fair Rate of Compensation for
Planning a Client's Estate, 13 Est. Plan. 194, 195 (1986).
57. Henderson, supra note 29, at 33; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Some Thoughts
on the Psychology of Estate Planning, 113 Tr. & Est. 568, 569 (1974).
58. E.g., Jerome A. Manning et al., Manning on Estate Planning § 1.2, at 1-4 (6th
ed. 2004) ("In some instances, the adviser will have achieved progress when the client
makes the appointment at which the interview will occur. There are many, many
people who are reluctant to make that appointment."); L. Paul Hood, Jr., From the
School of Hard Knocks: Thoughts on the Initial Estate Planning Interview, 27 Am. C.
Tr. & Est. Couns. J. 297, 299 (2002) ("Two of the most common complaints.., made
by estate planners about clients are procrastination and inaction.").
59. See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Teaching Materials on Estate Planning 5-7 (2d
ed. 2000); 1 William H. Page, Page on the Law of Wills § 1.6, at 31-33 (rev. ed. 2003).
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matter.. ,,60 Along with procrastination often comes superstition:
For centuries now, would-be testators have harbored the fear that if
they executed their wills, the documents would become relevant in
short order.6' (Yet, at the opposite extreme, one can also identify a
lunatic fringe of benefactors who compulsively revise their wills,
succumbing to a sort of testamentary logorrhea.) 62
60. 1 Page, supra note 59, § 1.6, at 31; see also, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley
M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 71 (6th ed. 2000); Manning, supra note 58, §
1,2, at 1-4; David K. Johns, Will Execution Ceremonies: Securing a Client's Last
Wishes, 23 Colo. Law. 47, 47 (1994); G. Warren Whitaker, Classic Issues in Family
Succession Planning, Prob. & Prop., Mar.-April, 2003, at 32, 36; William D. Zabel,
About Men; Last Will and Testament, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 82
(observations of an experienced estate planner). For empirical evidence that
procrastination is a major factor deterring testation, see Beyer, supra note 28, at 842;
Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1076-78; and Fellows et al., supra
note 9, at 339. A rude shock-a death in the family, or a brush with death-is
sometimes the trigger that overcomes this mind-set. See Sussman et al., supra note 28,
at 204.
61. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gutierrez, 11 Cal. Rptr. 51, 54 (Ct. App. 1961). For
observations by estate planners, see for example Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of
the Law of Wills § 38, at 159-60 (2d ed. 1953); James Comyn & Robert Johnson, Wills
and Intestacies 4 (1970) (British observation); Manning, supra note 58, §1.2, at 1-4;
Johns, supra note 60, at 47; and Zabel, supra note 60, at 82 (quoting Pablo Picasso's
attorney, who ascribed the artist's persistent refusal to execute a will to his
superstitiousness). This superstition has existed since at least the sixteenth century.
For an early English reference to this belief "amongst the ruder and more ignorant
people," see Henry Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills pt. 1, §
12, at 24 (photo. reprint 1978) (London, John Windet 1590). For an early American
reference, see Thomas' Administrator v. Lewis, 15 S.E. 389, 390 (Va. 1892). Yet,
oddly enough, in the farther reaches of the past a contrary attitude prevailed. In early
medieval England, people had a horror of intestacy, for to die without a will was to
die unconfessed. Hence, intestacy was rare at that time. 2 Frederick Pollock &
Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law 322,356-61 (2d ed. reissued 1968).
62. "The deceased was very much in the habit of making wills. Several of his old
wills and fragments of old wills are produced." Boylan v. Meeker, 15 N.J. Eq. 310, 357
(1854). For two more cases of testamentary obsession in the same century, afflicting
none other than the Lord Chancellor of England and a self-absorbed Italian countess,
see Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, 1 P.D. 154, 173 (C.A. 1876) ("It is evident, from the
number of testamentary papers, that the mind of the deceased was constantly
fluctuating as to the disposition of his property .. "); Roger L. Williams, Gaslight
and Shadow: The World of Napoleon III, 1851-1870, at 159-60 (1957) ("[I]n later
years... her chief occupation was a continual reworking of her Last Will and
Testament."). For a modern example, see Jeff Lee, Court Upholds Philanthropist's
Will Changes, Vancouver Sun, Aug. 11, 2000, at B1 (discussing the estate of a wealthy
testator who "had a penchant for changing his will virtually at the drop of a hat").
One estate planner identifies a related type, apparently obsessed with control-
"clients who ... spend[] enormous time and energy to create intricate and detailed
estate plans.., designed to rigidly control the management and distribution of their
assets for all eternity." Whitaker, supra note 60, at 36. Perhaps due to its rarity,
testamentary obsession (in its various forms) has yet to be investigated by the
psychologists, although some assert that any desire to make a will can indicate
depressive or suicidal tendencies. Thomas L. Shaffer, Death, Property, and Lawyers
117 (1970); see also Nathan Roth, The Psychiatry of Writing a Will 51 (1989)
(speculating about the related "compulsive need of some persons to write a new will
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These reports out of the client conference room coincide with
observations inside the laboratory. Cognitive psychologists in recent
years have developed and tested what they call "terror management
theory" to explain aspects of human behavior.63 Because human
beings uniquely possess the capacity to appreciate the inevitability of
their deaths and yet, like all organisms, are genetically adapted for
self-preservation, the thought of death inspires terror.' Studies
demonstrate that humans alleviate this terror in a variety of ways,
such as by overestimating their longevity, underestimating their
vulnerability to life-threatening illness, and by maneuvering to avoid
situations that would bring thoughts about mortality consciously to
mind.65 Estate planners' anecdotal observations about self-deceptive
foot-dragging and their uphill struggle to get clients actually to present
themselves in a law office-where, of course, they would directly
confront their mortality-fits neatly with the psychologists' findings in
other settings. 66  Meanwhile, the prevalence of socially-transmitted
before making any... journey, even though they make no noteworthy additions to
pre-existent wills").
63. For prior applications of terror management theory to the problem of
inheritance taxation, see Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L.
Rev. 567, 584-85 (2003); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 825, 863 (2001); Joel Slemrod, Thanatology and Economics: The Behavioral
Economics of Death, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.), May 2003, at 371, 373-74; see
also Donald P. Judges, Scared to Death: Capital Punishment As Authoritarian Terror
Management, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 155 (1999) (applying terror management theory
to the death penalty); Wojciech Kopezuk & Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and
Economic Behavior (Jan. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(applying terror management theory to saving/consumption behavior).
64. For a survey of terror management theory, see Eric Strachan et al., Coping
with the Inevitability of Death: Terror Management and Mismanagement, in Coping
with Stress 114 (C.R. Snyder ed., 2001). See also Robert Kastenbaum & Ruth
Aisenberg, The Psychology of Death 137-40 (3d ed. 2000) (suggesting speculative
extensions of the theory). With his usual wit, the filmmaker (and famous neurotic)
Woody Allen expressed his own terror of death: "It's not that I'm afraid to die, I just
don't want to be there when it happens." Love and Death (MGMIUA Studios 1975).
65. See Jeff Greenberg et al., Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and
Cultural Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements, 29
Advances in Exper. Soc. Pyschol. 61, 90-91, 105-14 (1997) (summarizing prior studies)
[hereinafter Greenberg et al., Terror Management]; Shannon K. McCoy et al.,
Transcending the Self: A Terror Management Perspective on Successful Aging, in
Death Attitudes and the Older Adult 37, 39-42 (Adrian Tomer ed., 2000) (same);
Tom Pyszczynski et al., A Dual-Process Model of Defense Against Conscious and
Unconscious Death-Related Thoughts: An Extension of Terror Management Theory,
106 Psychol. Rev. 835, 838-39 (1999) (same); Strachan et al., supra note 64, at 123-25
(same). For the most recent studies of defense mechanisms, see Jamie Arndt et al.,
Terror Management and Self-Awareness: Evidence that Mortality Salience Provokes
Avoidance of the Self-Focused State, 24 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1216 (1998);
and Jeff Greenberg et al., Proximal and Distal Defenses in Response to Reminders of
One's Mortality: Evidence of a Temporal Sequence, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 91 (2000).
66. Estate planners have observed directly the anxieties caused by the estate
planning process that psychologists would have predicted. See Shaffer, supra note 62,
at 109-26; Hood, supra note 58, at 300-01. For an identification of additional
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superstitious beliefs and their psychological roots in a desire to control
life's uncertainties-such as the time of one's death-has also drawn
scholarly attention.67
In short, psychological barriers accompany transaction costs,
conspiring to impede the testamentary process.68 What is more,
theory predicts that those psychological barriers should not be evenly
distributed across society. Wealthier benefactors should, on average,
remain more open to the process of testation, just as they are better
able to bear its costs. Of course, well-heeled persons ordinarily
receive more astute counsel and face more concerted efforts to get
past their denial of death or whatever other anxieties or phobias about
estate planning they may harbor.69 On top of that, studies suggest that
more successful persons are less susceptible to these psychological
forces and hence should be less prone to resist testation in the first
place. It comes as no surprise that richer, better educated persons
prove less superstitious, in general, than poorer, unschooled persons;
learning and credulity are inversely correlated.7" Intriguingly, an
assortment of studies likewise finds richer, better educated persons to
suffer less dread of death. These persons actually appear to have less
terror to manage.7' Accordingly, the social distribution of
psychological conditions that, if manifest, could deter will-making, see John M.
Astrachan, Why People Don't Make Wills, Tr. & Est., Apr. 1979, at 45, 46-50
(observations by a psychiatrist); and Fred 0. Henker, Psychological Aspects of
Writing a Will, 19 Med. Aspects Hum. Sexuality 17, 17-20 (1985) (same).
67. See Gustav Jahoda, The Psychology of Superstition 17-32, 127-37 (1969);
Stuart A. Vyse, Believing in Magic: The Psychology of Superstition 196-203 (1997).
68. Whether the same is ever true of the contracting process, operating to impede
bargaining in some settings, likewise merits investigation.
69. Sophisticated estate planners understand that they must deal sensitively with
"emotional roadblocks that can actually halt the financial planning process." Carol
Larco-Murzyn & Vanessa Bohrer, Think Like a Shrink, Tr. & Est., May 2002, at 43,
43; see also Roth, supra note 62, at 51-52; Shaffer, supra note 62, at 109-26; Hood,
supra note 58, at 298-301.
70. Jahoda, supra note 67, at 140 (remarking an inverse correlation between
superstitiousness and income); Vyse, supra note 67, at 37-41 (remarking an inverse
correlation between superstitiousness and education); Laura P. Otis & James E.
Alcock, Factors Affecting Extraordinary Belief, 118 J. Soc. Psychol. 77, 83-84 (1982)
(same); P.V. Ramamurti & D. Jamuna, Superstitious Beliefs Across the Age Span 20-
70, 31 J. Psychol. Res. 156, 157 (1987) (same); see also Vyse, supra note 67, at 46-47
(remarking an inverse correlation between superstitiousness and scores on
intelligence tests); Pat Killen et al., Superstitiousness and Intelligence, 34 Psychol. Rep.
1158, 1158 (1974) (same); Michael A. Thalbourne & Oriana Nofi, Belief in the
Paranormal, Superstitiousness and Intellectual Ability, 61 J. Soc'y for Psychical Res.
365, 369-70 (1997) (same).
71. "As ironic as it may be, those who ostensibly have more to live for have less
fear of death." Richard Lonetto & Donald I. Templer, Death Anxiety 13 (1986)
(citing to studies); see also Victor G. Cicirelli, Fear of Death in Older Adults:
Predictions from Terror Management Theory, 57B J. Gerontology: Psychol. Sci. P358,
P362 (2002) (finding a weak but significant negative correlation between death
anxiety and socioeconomic status). These findings support the predictions of terror
management theory, which posits that self-esteem functions as a buffer on anxiety.
See Greenberg et al., Terror Management, supra note 65, at 72-78, 93-94 (citing to
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psychological inhibitions acts to steepen the incline of the playing
field, amplifying the stratifying effect that transaction costs already
produce.
Empirical evidence corroborates these theoretical predictions.
Assorted studies have all found a pronounced correlation between
wealth and testation-the more prosperous one's circumstances, the
likelier one is to execute a will.7" And these effects are not felt merely
at the margin: Whereas rates of testation overall appear to have risen
over time, intestacy remains a common phenomenon today, covering
something around (or just under) one-half of the American
population.73
Accordingly, if lawmakers adjust default rules to fulfill social
concerns when in conflict with probable intent, wealthier benefactors
are likelier than poorer ones to have their distributive wishes
respected. Of course, an economist might respond that this residue of
social stratification is a normal concomitant of wealth maximization in
a capitalist economy. Yet, as Judge Richard Posner reminds us,
"there is more to justice than economics."7 4 The notion of individual
equality before the law, irrespective of one's means, has been a tenet
of Western political theory stretching back to Pericles, if not to the
studies); Eddie Harmon-Jones et al., Terror Management Theory and Self-Esteem:
Evidence That Increased Self-Esteem Reduces Mortality Salience Effects, 72 J.
Personality & Soc. Psych. 24 (1997). Higher self-esteem tends to flow from
socioeconomic status and thus ostensibly functions to mitigate fear of death. Jean M.
Twenge & W. Keith Campbell, Self-Esteem and Socioeconomic Status: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 6 Personality & Soc. Psych. Rev. 59 (2002); Cicirelli, supra, at P358-
60.
72. For a recent empirical study, see Marsha A. Goetting & Peter Martin,
Characteristics of Older Adults with Written Wills, 22 J. Fain. & Econ. Issues 243, 250-
58 (2001). See also Carole Shammas et al., Inheritance in America from Colonial
Times to the Present 17-18 (1987); Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 202-04;
Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1071-73; Dunham, supra note 54, at
263-64; Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 336-39; Edward H. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The
Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 393, 412. But cf. Janet Finch et al.,
Wills, Inheritance, and Families 55-57 (1996) (reporting results of a British study). Of
course, one can identify exceptions, such as the immensely wealthy Howard Hughes,
who died intestate in 1976. For a discussion of the Hughes estate, see Roger W.
Andersen & Ira Mark Bloom, Fundamentals of Trusts and Estates 40 (2d ed. 2002).
For a recent instance of a $19 million intestate estate, see In re Estate of Fosler, 13
P.3d 686 (Wyo. 2000).
73. Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 337 (reporting results of a study finding a rate of
testation over 45% and also citing to earlier studies); Goetting & Martin, supra note
72, at 253 (reporting results of a study finding a rate of testation of 66% and also
citing to a 1995 study finding a rate of testation of 69%); see also 1 Page, supra note
59, at 28-31 (citing to American studies); Shammas et al., supra note 72, at 16-19, 219-
20 (performing a historical study); M.C. Mirow, Last Wills and Testaments in England
1500-1800, 60 Recueils de la Socidtd Jean Bodin Pour L'Histoire Comparative Des
Institutions 47, 49 n.10 (1993) (citing to British historical studies).
74. Posner, supra note 23, § 2.3, at 28.
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pre-Socratics,75 manifested nowadays in such tangible sequelae as
public defenders, legal aid, and so on. In the same vein, Professor
Fellows has posited the objective of "equal planning under the law 76
as a guiding principle of lawmaking in the inheritance realm-a
natural extension of equality before the law, in that it affords
benefactors the advantages that legal representation would otherwise
provide.
Social defaults violate the principle of equal planning under law.
Whenever adopted, they discriminate against poorer benefactors, who
are more likely to accede to them even though they contradict their
preferences, whereas better heeled benefactors can more easily afford
to override them and implement their preferences.77 By comparison, a
majoritarian default would tend to level the playing field, allowing the
poor to accomplish their preferred estate plan at lower cost. What is
more, lawmakers gain an additional benefit when they achieve
equality in this way, because the alternative of offering state-
subsidized estate planning services would procure the same result at
far greater cost. Equal planning under law thus achieves, so to say,
moral efficiency: Aidful laws are invariably more efficient than aidful
lawyering.78
None of this is to suggest that social concerns have no place within
inheritance law. If lawmakers deem a distributive policy sufficiently
important as to merit widespread observation, however, they ought to
enforce it in an egalitarian manner. The solution is simple:
Lawmakers can impose a mandatory rule of inheritance and thereby
implement the policy impartially. 79
75. For discussions, see J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory 29-
30, 236, 291 (1992); Posner, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 267; Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural
Law and Justice 166-67 (1987); James Konow, Which Is the Fairest One of All? A
Positive Analysis of Justice Theories, 41 J. Econ. Lit. 1188, 1194-95 (2003); and
Geoffrey Marshall, Notes on the Rule of Equal Law, in 9 Nomos: Equality 261, 261-64
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1967).
76. Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 613
(1988).
77. Professor Fellows had hinted at this point in her early work emphasizing
intent effectuation as the primary goal of intestacy law. Her concern that intestacy
law not "create[] a trap for the ignorant or misinformed," holds manifestly greater
relevance with respect to poorer benefactors. See supra note 10.
78. This analysis has no clear parallel in the contractual realm, where issues of
inequality are ordinarily raised with regard to the relationship between contracting
parties, as opposed to pairs of parties inter se.
79. See generally Lewis M. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand (1955)
(addressing the utility of mandatory limits on testamentary freedom). A court once
mused about making all the default rules of intestacy mandatory: "In the absence of
any will, the law makes a wise, liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead man's
estate; so wise, indeed, that the policy of permitting wills at all is often gravely
questioned." In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895), modified on reh'g 42 P.
1082 (Cal. 1896) (per curiam).
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d. Expressive and Transformative Defaults
The analysis presented up to now relies upon the implicit
assumption (usual to economists) that preferences are static and
exogenous. If we assume instead (as the psychologists do) that
preferences are mutable and endogenous, then additional arguments
for the formulation of default rules can present themselves.80
The latter assumption underlies the thesis offered by a number of
inheritance scholars, quoted earlier,8' that intestacy law can fulfill an
"expressive function," exemplifying what the state considers an
appropriate devolution of wealth. To the extent the message is
directed toward the community at large, a rule of intestacy ostensibly
serves to promote moral acceptance of relationships not otherwise
culturally countenanced. To the extent the message is also directed to
benefactors themselves, the rule ostensibly serves to encourage the
development of donative preferences that the state deems socially
desirable.
A copious general literature on the expressive function of law
already exists, and the theory has now coalesced around a core of
ideas.82 Put simply, the theorists posit that because norms of behavior
are malleable, even "fragile, 83 they will naturally form and reform in
response to incessant private interactions, which can also trigger a
cascade effect ending in the proliferation of a uniform norm
throughout society. Government can inject itself into this ferment and
endeavor to participate in "norm management,""s for example, by
launching a rhetorical campaign-or simply by passing a law. Law
affects the actions of citizens through coercion, of course, but it can
also do so-sometimes more effectively-by "making statements "85
that imbue those actions with new social meanings and alter the
80. For a recent discussion of the chasm separating economists from psychologists
with respect to this, and other, behavioral axioms, see Daniel Kahneman, A
Psychological Perspective on Economics, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.), May
2003, at 162, 163-65. See also Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural
Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 75 (1998).
81. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
82. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2021 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social
Norms]. An antecedent to expressive theory was the theory of civic republicanism.
See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 801, 811-14, 822-33 (1993). For a still earlier antecedent, see Aristotle, The
Nicomachean Ethics 352-58 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987) (c. 334-323 B.C.).
83. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 82, at 909.
84. Id. at 907.
85. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at 2024.
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private judgments citizens face within their communities. Through
the experience of shame or esteem, citizens may even come to
internalize the ballyhooed norm.
It is this theory that several inheritance scholars have taken up and
run with, but here they have carried it beyond its credible range. On
analysis, the expressive ramifications of intestacy law appear
alternately negligible and irrelevant, and the conclusion follows that
they should not influence the formulation of rules of intestacy or other
inheritance defaults in (virtually)8 6 any respect.
Consider first the expressivists' claim that intestacy law offers a
"powerful symbol"87 about which relationships the community ought
to respect. Thus conceived, intestacy law again comprises a social
default, albeit of a special sort-one that benefits society not because
of the wealth transfers that result from it, but because of their
symbolic impact on third parties.
We have earlier questioned the usefulness and propriety of social
defaults in general,88 but here a more fundamental criticism looms:
Are the benefits even tangible? Not all laws can reasonably be
anticipated to have attitudinal consequences. As Cass Sunstein
cautions, "for purposes of law, any support for 'statements' should be
rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in
plausible judgments about its effect on social norms." 89 Indeed, when
laws predicated on expressivism are not only futile as an instrument of
norm management but also economically injurious, they "verge on
fanaticism.'9
The notion that lawmaking can ever have a significant impact on
public attitudes toward the morality of relationships ("familial
norms")91 appears doubtful; citizens do not look to lawmakers as
authorities when they make this sort of judgment.9" Additionally,
86. For one possible and limited exception, see infra notes 186-88 and
accompanying text.
87. Spitko, supra note 14, at 1100.
88. See supra Part I.C.2.b-c.
89. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at 2045.
90. Id. at 2047.
91. Spitko, supra note 14, at 1100.
92. See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at 2026 (observing, by
analogy, that legalization of prostitution would probably have a negligible impact on
social norms). Although psychological evidence suggests that persons are subject to
persuasion by authority figures, which lawmakers are, those figures must still be
accounted authorities on the matter at hand, which lawmakers are not. We might
expect ministers, for example, to be more persuasive managers of familial norms. See
Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice 8-10, 179-88, 196-97 (4th ed.
2001). What is more, persuasion will not occur in the absence of trust, id. at 197-99,
possibly a significant impediment to the influence of lawmakers. Professor Sunstein
recognizes that efforts by government to manage some norms "may fail for lack of
trust." Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 82, at 952; see also Adler, supra note 82, at
1467; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at 2049. Nevertheless, the
proposition that a law can influence social norms is necessarily "grounded on the view
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rules of inheritance are at best tangentially related to the social
acceptance of family relationships, having no bearing whatsoever on
everyday life; by comparison, rules against discrimination have more
widespread repercussions and would be far likelier to engender
attitudinal changes, if any rules can.
Intestacy law is also relatively obscure. Only those persons directly
affected by it have an incentive to acquaint themselves with it. Nor
does the community truly witness intestacy law in action; people may
see property inherited, of course, but without having any way of
knowing whether the transfer occurred under a rule of law, or under
an estate plan. 93
Finally, and more generally, there is the fact that rules of intestacy
are nothing other than default rules. As such, they do not represent
strong statements about anything.94 On the contrary, considered from
a structural perspective, default rules signal legal deference to private
values.
Yet, expressive inheritance defaults can simultaneously implicate
costs. Whenever they contradict the preferences of most benefactors,
they wastefully contribute to transaction costs. Such rules will meet
Professor Sunstein's definition of fanatical ones.9s On the other hand,
whenever they conform with the preferences of most benefactors,
expressive inheritance defaults are majoritarian in nature and hence
have no independent theoretical significance; their expressive
radiations are incidental and irrelevant to lawmakers' formulation of
the rule at issue. 6
But that brings us to the expressivists' second assertion-to wit, that
intestacy laws can serve to change not only how "others view" familial
relationships, but also how the parties to those relationships "view
themselves.... shap[ing] ... [their] relations.., to each other."97 By
influencing benefactors to internalize familial norms, expressive laws
that law will have moral weight and thus convince people that existing norms are bad
and deserve to be replaced by new ones." Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note
82, at 2031; see also Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or
Equilibrium Selection (2003) (U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Public Law Research
Paper No. 138) (finding, in an experimental study, that expressive sanctions had no
effect on preferences but could affect behavior in situations where coordination
provided a Pareto-superior equilibrium) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=452420.
93. Theorists have recognized that the obscurity of a rule dampens its expressive
effect. See McAdams, supra note 82, at 362, 389 n.127; Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 404 n.217
(1997); Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at 2050-51.
94. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 414 ("[P]ersons are unlikely to abandon
considered views merely because the state enacts a nonbinding rule that these persons
think is objectionable.").
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
97. Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 91; see also Spitko, supra note 14, at 1101.
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could have the effect of reconfiguring donative preferences.9" To the
extent the effect is merely to reinforce a preexisting majority
preference, the expressive ramifications of a rule are once again
irrelevant to its composition. But to the extent a rule encourages
parties to form a new majority preference, it becomes intent-
effectuating as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, thereby dynamically
reconciling social concerns with efficiency.
The possibility of adopting default rules in order to change parties'
preferences had in fact been aired within the contracts literature
before inheritance scholars joined the discussion. Alan Schwartz
called such rules "transformative defaults."99 He counseled against
them, however, on the ground that their powers of persuasion were
speculative at best and hence, like social defaults, would magnify
transaction costs.1
For reasons already discussed, Professor Schwartz is right to
question the potential of default rules to affect parties' preferences.
In the context of intestacy, although benefactors (unlike other
members of a community) do have an incentive to become informed
about the rules that apply to them, they have no reason to accord
them moral weight. 1' Indeed, even more than other sorts of transfers
and transactions, estate planning is a process well-insulated from any
sort of external moral influence, 102 a proposition that finds support in
at least one empirical investigation.0 3
98. The expressivists are vague, and perhaps a trifle uncertain, about what aspects
of parties' relations they would intend intestacy law to change. See Fellows et al.,
supra note 12, at 22, 91 & n.350; Spitko, supra note 14, at 1101 & n.197. Plainly, the
prospect of altering donative preferences is not central to their vision. To the extent
that their concern is to affect how parties behave otherwise toward each other within
a relationship, the foregoing analysis remains pertinent.
99. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 391; see also Charny, supra note 51, at 1836-37.
100. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 396, 413-15; cf Charny, supra note 51, at 1867-68
(asserting that when default rules do change preferences, intent effectuation becomes
circular, leaving lawmakers no choice but to look to other social values); Cass R.
Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 109-12, 124-34 (2002)
(same).
101. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. For the suggestion that default
rules can influence norms when citizens believe that government possesses better
information than they do about which choice is superior, see Korobkin, supra note 1,
at 1247, 1271; and Sunstein, supra note 100, at 114-16. Of course, as concerns
donative choices, benefactors are-and know that they are-better informed about
how best to allocate their wealth than are lawmakers. Norms of conduct may also be
internalized over time simply by virtue of repeated conformity but, as Professor
Schwartz points out, that should not occur in connection with a disapproved default
rule, which parties will reject from the outset. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 414. At any
rate, estate planning is not a repetitive, habitual activity. Finally, the suggestion that
the endowment effect can cause persons to prefer any given default rule, see
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1269-74 (citing to earlier discussions), is irrelevent to
inheritance defaults, which create for the benefactor no initial rights or interests.
102. Wills remain private documents until death, at which point benefactors need
no longer fear the social consequences of their decisions (apart from their effects on
their reputations post mortem). Hence, will-making comprises "an exercise of power
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In sum, scholars who would import expressive legal theory into the
realm of inheritance defaults are barking up the wrong doctrinal tree.
But even if this dog will hunt, one could object more fundamentally to
the whole enterprise. The notion that the state can legitimately
undertake to manipulate moral attitudes and even preferences
concerning matters so personal as familial relations is, to say the least,
politically disquieting."°  Secondarily, such a theoretical vision also
leads legal policy in the direction of functional indeterminacy.10 5 In
this regard, one might add, inheritance scholars who have found
expressive theory so alluring betray a distinctly academic blend of
arrogance and naivet& Assume for a moment the scholars gained
acceptance of their view. Whose morality and preferences, then,
should inheritance law express? Why, theirs of course! The scholars,
in fact, have taken their stance precisely with an eye to promoting an
agenda, namely the legal and social recognition of nontraditional
families."6 Yet, once lawmakers accept the invitation to manage
citizens' morals and preferences, who is to say which ones elected
without responsibility[,] [f]ree of the constraint of what the neighbours would think."
M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 Jurid. Rev. 172, 173; see also Adam J. Hirsch,
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 33, 53-55 (1999);
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 43, at 13. For an example of external influence upon inter
vivos gift-giving behavior, by comparison, see Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List
Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Request to Donate Money, 67 J. Applied
Psychol. 110 (1982).
103. A study endeavoring to assess the strength of outside influences upon testators
concluded:
[Evidence of] the social influences of family, friends, attorneys,
governments.., was much less direct and less obvious than is implied by
writers from the family-community position and the legalist position. No
instances were found in which a testator said or implied that he or she was
unduly influenced or pressured by any of these entities into making various
choices or statements within the will.... If, however, we are willing to
assume that the less obvious influences of family, friends and community are
manifested by "standard" wills,.., then almost one-half (48 percent) of the
testators were at least indirectly influenced by these social entities.... On
the other hand, about 42 percent of the testators manifested enough
individuality that there their wills were considered to be more personalized
than they were socially influenced.
T.P. Schwartz, Testamentary Behavior: Issues and Evidence About Individuality,
Altruism and Social Influences, 34 Soc. Q. 337, 349-50 (1993); cf. infra note 176.
104. For a general (and withering) criticism of norm management by the state, see
Gey, supra note 82, at 822-33, 894-98. Compare Professor Sunstein, who defends
norm management by the state as legitimate within the same bounds as "any other
kind of governmental action," hence so long as it does not "invade rights, whatever
our understanding of rights may be." Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 82, at
2048-49; see also id. at 2029-33. On this theory, however, government efforts to instill
familial norms would be vulnerable to challenge as an invasion of citizens' privacy
rights. For additional pertinent discussions, see the sources cited infra note 184.
105. The same could be said of any default rule theory that pays regard to
amorphous "state interests." See supra text accompanying note 20. Here the difficulty
is compounded by the moral relativism of familial norms.
106. See Fellows et al., supra note 12; Spitko, supra note 14.
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officials -themselves influenced by the persuasive expressions of
interest groups1°7-will see fit to propagate? In due time, scholars
might rue the day when they gave their imprimatur to. the
politicization of inheritance law.1"8
3. Penalty Defaults
We have one final aspect of default rule theory to look at in the
inheritance field-possibly with reflections back into its field of origin.
That is Professor Ayres's argument, summarized earlier, 1 9 that
contractual defaults can, in some circumstances, enhance efficiency by
contradicting preferences. When "purposefully set at what the parties
would not want," ' 0 a default rule creates incentives for parties to
contract around them. That action is costly, to be sure, but it may
entail as a by-product the disclosure of valuable information. If the
value of the information gained exceeds the transaction cost, a penalty
default is efficient.
Ayres identifies three potential recipients of the information
elicited by a penalty default: (1) less informed bargainers under
conditions where asymmetric information generates inefficiencies; (2)
interested third parties, such as creditors (under those same
conditions); and (3) courts."' In the context of inheritance, only the
benefactor has a say in the transfer, and a will induced by a penalty
default would reveal no useful information to interested parties, for it
remains a private document until death and creates mere
expectancies.'1
2
Ayres's analysis of courts' interest in the disclosure of information,
on the other hand, could have a bearing on inheritance defaults. His
point is this: When parties leave a gap in a contract, they implicitly
delegate to the legal system the task of filling that gap. Accordingly,
107. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 12-
37 (1991).
108. One scholar considers the door to expressive lawmaking already wide open:
The potential of succession law to affect [sic] change in cultural norms is at
the heart of the debate over same-sex equality and succession law
reform.... If exclusionists and inclusionists agree on nothing else, they
share a similar view of the expressive function of same-sex equality under
the law.
Spitko, supra note 14, at 1099-1100. Well, "exclusionists" and "inclusionists" may
share this view, but default rule theorists do not share it, and only a handful of
political theorists share it. Ironically, by repudiating the use of law to change social
values and insisting that lawmakers focus exclusively on probable intent, scholars
could still make a case-and far more persuasively -for intestacy reform with respect
to nontraditional families. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
110. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91.
111. Id. at 97 & n.48.
112. Competent testators remain free to amend or revoke their wills at will, hence a
will cannot be relied on.
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[i]f it is costly for the courts to determine what the parties would
have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces
the parties to contract explicitly. In other words, penalty defaults
are appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term
ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post what the parties
would have wanted. Courts, which are publicly subsidized, should
give parties incentives to negotiate ex ante by penalizing them for
inefficient gaps. 13
By analogy, a default rule purposefully contrary to the wishes of
most benefactors would encourage them to reveal their preferences,
lest the default rule go into operation-thereby sparing courts from
the task of filling gaps in their estate plans.
In fact, long before Professor Ayres worked out this thesis, several
inheritance scholars had entertained the idea of using intestacy law to
such an end. Allison Dunham stole a march on default rule theory
nearly half a century ago, by suggesting the possibility of drafting
"intestate succession law... with the purpose of 'inducing' wills."
1 4
Professor Dunham continued:
Society might decide that distribution by private volition is such a
major value that it should do everything within its power to induce
people to make a will. From such a point of view, society might well
conclude that the intestate succession law should deviate from
common understanding and expectation in order to induce people to
do what society has assumed to be desirable." 5
As early as 1935, Professor Atkinson had apprehended the germ of
this idea. He advocated the expansion of escheat-whereby the state
confiscates the estates of intestate decedents who lack close
relatives-to increase public revenue, adding that "if people indulged
in will-making" to preserve their wealth, "this very process of
testamentary execution would result in a great social gain. Because
testators would consider the deserts and the needs of the beneficiaries,
their wills would undoubtedly provide better plans of distribution than
present intestate laws do with respect to remote collaterals."'
116
Escheat, then, could function as a penalty default, forcing benefactors
113. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 93; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 31,
at 1596-98.
114. Letter from Allison Dunham, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Chicago (Apr. 24, 1968),
quoted in Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 84 n.6.
115. Id.
116. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 197. To the same effect a generation later, see
Browder, supra note 31, at 1312 ("A decedent who was unhappy with [an escheat]
would presumably be induced to make a judgment by will which would probably be
more thoughtful and sensible than a mechanical pursuit of his remote kindred.").
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to choose between disclosing their preferences or accepting a
draconian estate plan that no one, save Justice Holmes,117 would want.
Yet, the logic of all this remains problematic. One may observe,
first of all, that penalty defaults bear a curious, mirror-image
resemblance to social defaults: Whereas social defaults exploit apathy
in order to reach a socially desirable end, penalty defaults spur activity
in order to achieve the same end. Hence, whereas action to override a
social default offsets its social utility, inaction frustrates a penalty
default. The "stickier" a penalty default,"' the more ineffectual it is.
And because every default rule will prove at least somewhat sticky,119
penalty defaults can never operate perfectly-an observation
applicable to both contractual and inheritance defaults.
In the inheritance arena, penalty defaults are vulnerable to a second
criticism. Just as social defaults discriminate against poorer
benefactors due to disparate tendencies to (in)action,12 ° so penalty
defaults will do likewise. In similar ways, both infringe the principle
of equal planning under law.'21
More fundamentally, however, a penalty default that coerces
parties to disclose preferences ex ante generates no judicial economy
if the parties would otherwise want the gap to be filled with a rigid
default rule. Such a rule is no more costly to carry into execution ex
post than the explicit testamentary (or contractual) language that a
penalty default would induce. Either way, the court will be called
upon to enforce (and construe) inflexible provisions set out either in a
statute, or in an instrument.'22 Where that is our choice, the default
rule more closely consonant with probable intent provides greater
efficiency, because it also lessens transaction costs.
The only sort of preferred default lawmakers could reasonably deny
parties on grounds of judicial economy is a discretionary default,
whereby the court estimates preferences on a case-by-case basis. But
even that sort of default would remain efficient if lawmakers imposed
the full cost of the resulting judicial proceeding on the parties, and a
majority still favored that route. At any rate, discretionary
inheritance defaults are unlikely to be popular, for reasons discussed
later in this Article. 123
117. For Justice Holmes's famous estate plan (executed when he was a childless
widower), see G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner
Self 472-73 (1993).
118. To recall Ayres's terminology. See supra note 52.
119. This is Ayres's "iron law of default inertia." See supra note 52.
120. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
122. If anything, a mechanical statute is likely to cost less to implement than an
instrument, on average, because instruments vary in the quality of their drafting and
hence tend to breed construction litigation.
123. See infra Part I.D.l.c. In connection with escheat, see infra notes 228-30 and
accompanying text.
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Now, on closer inspection, it would appear that Professors Dunham
and Atkinson put the case for penalty defaults on a slightly different,
but related, basis. Their argument seems to have been that by
inducing wills society could benefit not by forcing out information that
a court needs to simplify adjudication, but by forcing out information
that a court needs to divide an estate sensibly. If, by hypothesis, an
individualized approach to estate planning yields greater welfare than
a mechanical one, then we derive greater efficiency by pressing the
benefactor to engage in that enterprise.
However inventive, this argument ultimately does not hold water.
Although theorists have justified freedom of testation, inter alia, on
the ground that it facilitates thoughtful estate planning,124 this
advantage follows from benefactors' own eagerness to behave
thoughtfully. If some benefactors prove unresponsive to this
opportunity, and would just as soon die intestate, then a penalty
default might induce will-making, but it cannot induce benefactors to
plan judiciously. Instead, they can execute simple wills that suffice to
avoid the penalty but prove no more edifying than the uninformed
estate plan lawmakers implement with greater efficiency by adopting
a simple, majoritarian default.
At the end of the day, penalty defaults have no place in our
inheritance law. Neither do social defaults, nor expressive defaults, as
we have already concluded. That leaves majoritarian defaults as the
exclusive means of achieving public policy within the arena of
gratuitous transfers. As contractual default rule theory has helped us
to clarify, more eclectic approaches to intestacy rules, and to
inheritance defaults in general, whether grounded in fairness or public
policy or didactics, all prove a trompe l'oeil, superficially pleasing to
the eye and to the emotions, perhaps, but ultimately both costly and
discriminatory. Thin on analysis to begin with, those approaches
merit re-examination by scholars and rejection by lawmakers.
D. The Problems of Evidence
We are not quite done with our theory, however: As usual, our
answer to the question of how to set inheritance defaults gives birth to
other questions. Next comes the matter of determining how to
structure default rules premised on probable intent so as best to
achieve that goal; and also the matter of their derivation-that is,
determining how to infer the donative preferences that will serve as
templates for our default rules.
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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1. Structuring Majoritarian Defaults
In assessing how to fashion majoritarian inheritance defaults,
several related issues require our attention: the sorts of contingencies
that should form the building blocks of our default rules, the level of
complexity of those contingencies, and the extent to which courts
should retain elbow room to reach outcomes at their discretion.
a. Contingencies
By tradition, default rules in inheritance law have hinged on
relational contingencies-who is married to whom, who is kindred to
whom, who is or is not alive when the transfer occurs. Considered in
the abstract, however, any factual contingencies could compose the
raw material for a majoritarian default so long as they further the
objective of intent effectuation. Do any theoretical limits cabin in this
principle?
One thing we can say is that unless a factual contingency is defined
precisely and objectively, costly litigation could be required to resolve
its meaning (just as when a testator introduces ambiguities into a will).
That defeats the purpose of default rule efficiency. But this
observation speaks more to the matter of lawmakers' professional
competence in drafting default rules than to the sorts of factual
inquiries they ought to warrant.
What if the factual inquiry is expensive to undertake? One
argument that the Commissioners have made in favor of restricting
the range of intestate beneficiaries to near relatives is that doing so
"simplifies proof of heirship." '25  On its face, this again seems a
relevant efficiency concern, but on further analysis it proves to be
specious. If a majority of benefactors would want to authorize the
expense-say, a search for distant relatives-then the exclusion of
preferred beneficiaries as heirs simply increases transaction costs. No
negative externality is implicated here, because the cost of any factual
inquiries is borne by the probate estate itself, as an administrative
expense. 26
b. Complexity
It would seem, then, that any sort of pertinent contingency can
underlie a majoritarian default. But this leads into another difficulty
with the very concept of majoritarian defaults: For the range of
contingencies that lawmakers can allow for, statistically
125. Unif. Probate Code art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2003), 8 U.L.A. 271 (1998)
(pre-1990 version of article II).
126. C. Tim Rodenbush, Missing Heirs: Put Yourself in Their Shoes, Tr. & Est.,
Dec. 1991, at 53, 53.
1062 [Vol. 73
20041 DEFAULTRULES IN INHERITANCE LAW
approximating intent more or less precisely, is boundless. Hence,
merely to espouse the aim of effectuating probable intent is to leave
open an alarming multitude of options. Where, in their prognostic
zeal, should lawmakers draw the line?
This ultimately becomes a key question. Unfortunately, the answer
to it is easier to set out in theory than to locate in practice. The
number of contingencies lawmakers add to a rule-and hence the
overall complexity of that rule -simultaneously yields benefits and
entails costs. As lawmakers add to the complexity of a rule, the
marginal benefit of complexification must eventually decline, while
the marginal cost grows. A rule becomes optimally complex when the
net benefit reaches its maximum value-that is, where the marginal
benefit equals the marginal cost.127
In connection with default rules, the benefit of a more complex rule
is that, properly crafted, it improves the rule's "fit" to the facts and
hence raises the probability of effectuating intent in any given case-
which in turn enhances parties' opportunities to economize by relying
on the rule. The cost of complexity is the greater sums parties must
expend to learn and apply the rule-thereby reducing the cost
efficiency of reliance.'28 If the information cost ever grew to the point
that it exceeded the transaction cost, the default rule would become
self-defeating, for then parties would find it cheaper to opt out than to
learn the rule as a prelude to relying on it, vel non.1 29 But even before
a default rule collapses under its own weight, there comes a point at
which lawmakers should leave well alone. We model the problem
below in Appendix II.
The problem of legal complication is further complicated by
another phenomenon: Different benefactors (and commercial actors)
can rely on a default rule at different levels of specificity. 3 Whereas
some benefactors might see fit to familiarize themselves with the fine
details of (let us say) intestacy law, other more insouciant ones would
be satisfied to know that if they spare the expense of executing a will
127. See generally Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal
Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150 (1995) (addressing the problem from the perspective
of mandatory rules).
128. Complexity also increases the cost of crafting a rule, although that is a one-
time cost and hence should be relatively insignificant, given the number of parties
who can benefit over a space of time before the rule requires (again costly) updating.
But cf. Ayres, supra note 23, at 10-14 (emphasizing "promulgation costs"); Clayton P.
Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J.
167, 183-84 (1993) (suggesting that complexity increases error costs, i.e., the risk that a
default rule will be misapplied).
129. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Repeat players can amortize
information costs over the series of their transactions, a consideration not strictly
relevant to transfers at death, which only occur once. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
130. For a theoretical recognition, see Ayres, supra note 23, at 8.
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their immediate family will benefit."' They can thereby penetrate a
complex default rule to an adequate depth, from their perspective, at
relatively little cost. By hypothesis, these parties should be indifferent
to the degree of complexity of a default rule that they can digest
cheaply in any event, because it is either simple or simplifiable.132 By
the same token, they should be content to join a coalition of parties
who insist on complete information before they will rely on a default
rule. Hence, it is the costs and benefits of those parties who would
inquire into a default rule in detail that bear on an analysis of optimal
complexity, so long as they add up to more than a nominal number.133
Theoretical models to one side, lawmakers must exercise their
(hopefully conscious) judgment about whether additional layers of
complexity are worth the costs. Perhaps a sensible rule of thumb to
adopt is that an inheritance default-or any component thereof 134-
should never become so complex that it appears to require specific
consultation with an attorney to fathom. Once the client has borne
the expense of a conference to establish the relevant data, the further
expense of drafting (versus abstaining from drafting) becomes
marginal, hence robbing the default rule of its potential for
transaction-cost efficiency.135
131. See Joel R. Glucksman, Note, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does it
Conform to Popular Expectations?, 12 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 253, 261-66 (1976)
(reporting results of an empirical study finding that 76% of randomly chosen state
residents "knew enough about the state of intestacy law to realize that intestate
property goes to the family" yet "showed little knowledge of the intestate succession
law's precise terms"); see also Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1077-
78; Fellows et al., supra note 49, at 722-23; Johnson & Robbennolt, supra note 49, at
489; cf Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 340 & n.73 (reporting results of an empirical
study finding that over 70% of intestates "indicated they knew who would inherit
their estates if they died without wills," although also finding widespread confusion
about the distributive "subtleties" of local intestacy law). For references to British
studies, see Finch et al., supra note 72, at 44. Here, we might say, the default rule at
issue breaks down into different components: one relatively more consequential and
more readily accessible (who benefits); the other relatively less consequential and
more obscure (how those benefits are divided).
132. In the context of intestacy, for example, benefactors who care mainly about
(1) who the heirs are, rather than (2) the division among them, should be indifferent
when presented with a choice between, on the one hand, a complex default rule under
which they can cheaply make the first determination and only expensively the second;
and, on the other hand, a simple default rule under which they can make both
determinations cheaply. See also infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
133. Once we reach a level of complexity that will affect testamentary behavior in
only a small number of cases, the cost of lawmaking does become significant to the
law's efficiency. See supra note 128.
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
135. See Finch et al., supra note 72, at 44. Finch notes:
[T]he amount of time required to clarify these issues with a client is only
slightly greater if a will is drafted, yet it may be easier to make a more
economic charge than where only advice is provided. Drafting a will is more
likely to lead to profitable business in winding up the estate than if the
[attorney] had merely provided advice, for whose source relatives would
have no tangible evidence.
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c. Discretion
Rather than tinker with the intricacy of inheritance defaults,
lawmakers could proceed in a different direction: They could grant
courts discretion to establish probable intent on a case-by-case basis.
In other words, instead of endeavoring to anticipate the manifold
contingencies that might affect intent and factoring them into a
complex, mechanical default rule, lawmakers could mandate intent
effectuation as a default standard and delegate to courts the task of
reconstructing intent in a postmortem hearing.
Discretionary inheritance defaults have some historical precedent in
American law, 136 and pockets of discretion can be found in a handful
of state probate codes today.137 Overall, however, default standards
are few and far between in the inheritance realm; default rules
dominate this segment of the legal landscape.
That lawmakers should have favored rules over standards when
setting inheritance defaults appears appropriate as a theoretical
proposition. 3 s The eternal tension between the certainty of rules,
Id.; see also Gary, Parent-Child, supra note 12, at 653.
136. For elements of discretion in the intestacy law of colonial Massachusetts, see
George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies,
51 Yale L.J. 1280, 1282-85 (1942). For discretion under medieval English intestacy
law, see Intestacy in Legal History, Law Times, Mar. 20, 1926, at 241.
137. E.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1-6 (1995) (allowing courts discretion to grant a
surviving spouse up to $75,000 worth of real property from an intestate estate, if no
issue survived the decedent); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 401 (2002) (allowing courts
discretion to determine the intestate share of a surviving spouse, above a minimum of
one-third of the estate); see also infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text. Family
maintenance legislation in Great Britain and other Commonwealth states provide
courts somewhat broader discretion to deviate from the mechanical rules of intestacy.
See S.M. Cretney, Reform of Intestacy: The Best We Can Do?, 111 Law Q. Rev. 77,
83-86 (1995); Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report
on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 283-87 (1955);
see also Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The
Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 77 (1998).
138. Prior commentators have divided on the issue. Compare Contemporary
Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1120-23 (favoring judicial discretion within intestacy
law), and Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L.
Rev. 199, 263-68 (2001) (same), and Gary, Adapting Intestacy, supra note 12, at 67-73
(same), and John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. Miami
L. Rev. 497, 559-60, 562-63 (1977) (same), and Laufer, supra note 137, at 283, 312-14
(same), and Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws
Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law Tradition,
2 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 447 passim (2003) (same; comparative study), with
Atkinson, supra note 61, § 5, at 38 (opposing discretion), and Brashier, supra note 12,
at 6-7, 208-09 (same), and Ascher, supra note 20, at 640-41, 658 (same), and Bruce H.
Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1033, 1050 (1994) (same), and M.C. Meston, Succession-Rights or Discretion?, 1987
Jurid. Rev. 1, 6, 9-11 (same), and Frederick R. Schneider, A Kentucky Study of Will
Provisions: Implications for Intestate Succession Law, 13 N. Ky. L. Rev. 409, 426-27
(1987) (same). For an early discussion, see Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil
Code, in 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 297, 334 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (c. 1775-
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contemplated ex ante, and the justice of standards, applied ex post,
resolves itself relatively easily in this context.'3 9 On the one hand,
benefactors presented with a default standard of intent effectuation
could take solace in knowing that a wide range of evidence-wider
than any rule could accommodate' 40-can go into the process of
reconstructing probable intent, albeit at the cost of litigation between
potential beneficiaries that the state only partially subsidizes (and
need not subsidize at all). On the other hand, benefactors presented
with a rigid default rule could anticipate the consequences of the rule
precisely and appreciate further that the rule will be applied routinely
and efficiently.
Within the commercial realm, parties have always rated legal
certainty a valuable, if not an essential, underpinning for business
planning. Because they are risk averse, commercial actors prefer to
know, so far as possible, the consequences of their transactions.'
The same principle should extend to gratuitous transfers: Risk averse
benefactors will likewise want to know with assurance the distributive
consequences of their munificence.'42
1802) thereinafter Works] (preferring "general presumptions" of intent to its
reconstruction case-by-case because the latter exercise would occasion "infinite
disputes"). See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165 (1986).
139. For a classic discussion of the rule/standard dichotomy, see Roscoe Pound, An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 59-71 (rev. ed. 1954) (1922). For modern
discussions, see, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); and Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988).
140. That body of evidence cannot, however, include unformalized expressions of
the party's particular intent without abolishing, in effect, the formality requirements
for wills. See Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex. 1971) ("The intention of the
testator must be found.., in the words of the will, and for that reason his other
declarations of intention ... are generally not admissible."). Even if a majority of
parties would prefer that courts give effect to statements of intent informally
expressed, the formality requirements have at least traditionally comprised a
mandatory rule. For a discussion of the justifications for mandatory will formalities,
see Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers,
51 Yale L.J. 1, 5-13 (1941).
141. "[The] security of transactions ... call[s] for [a] rule or conception
authoritatively prescribed in advance and mechanically applied.... [C]ommercial
contracts cannot be suffered to depend in any degree on the unique circumstances of
the controversies in which they come in question." Roscoe Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision (pt. 3), 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 957 (1923); see also id. at 951; Pound,
supra note 139, at 69. For a modern discussion, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 601-05 (2003). See
also Kaplow, supra note 139, at 605 (recognizing the relevance of risk aversion to the
preference for rules). But see Ayres, supra note 23, at 6 ("[T]he hypothetical contract
approach does not exclude standards as optimal law. It might be that the majority of
contracting parties would prefer to be governed by a 'reasonableness' standard rather
than any.., rule."). We shall consider Ayres's analysis of the potential efficiency of
default standards forthwith. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
142. Dean Pound himself amalgamated inheritances with commercial transactions
in this respect-in both instances, "general security is the controlling element."
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Indeed, this logic applies a fortiori in the venue of gratuity: Here,
the tension between certainty and individualized appraisal of intent is
less vexing, because the need for individualization is less acute. In the
context of a transaction, parties must make an initial, unalterable
choice between the certainty of a rule and the discriminate accuracy of
a standard. If they give priority to certainty, either by an explicit
contractual term or by implicit adoption of a default rule, they must
live with the consequences when contingencies unanticipated under
the term or rule arise. By contrast, wills are ambulatory. Benefactors
can give priority to certainty without endangering discriminate
accuracy, because they can override an explicit testamentary provision
or implicit adoption of a default rule, should unanticipated
contingencies ever materialize. If, for example, a certain but
indiscriminate rule of intestacy were to prove insufficiently responsive
to a benefactor's evolving circumstances, she could always execute a
will to escape the rule's dictates. A discretionary standard serves little
purpose under these conditions, because the benefactor can exercise
her own discretion. An uncertain but flexible standard of intestacy
should appeal only to those parties who are hypersensitive to
transaction costs yet simultaneously numb to beneficiaries' litigation
costs.
When the law at issue is a default law, it should bow to the parties'
structural preferences, just as it should defer to their substantive
preferences.'43 As with distributive intent, if most parties desire
certainty-an assumption susceptible to empirical study4"-then its
denial will only spur them to opt out in greater numbers, at higher
cost. Any larger concern for the justice of a discretionary standard is
irrelevant in this context.
Contrary to all of this, Professor Ayres posits two arguments for the
proposition that a default standard could, in theory, prove more
efficient than a default rule. First, he asserts, a majority of parties
might prefer a standard to a rule if it featured lower information costs
at less punctilious levels of inquiry:
Pound, supra note 139, at 69; see also Pound, supra note 141, at 956-57. A recent
court similarly emphasizes the "useful certainty in the law" of inheritance, absent
which "one could anticipate frequent litigation in which parties dispute the intimacies
of family life. Not only would such litigation often be destructive of familial
relationships, it could significantly disrupt property transactions and estate planning."
Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 360 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). For a
historical observation, see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 303-
04 (3d ed. 1990).
143. Lawmakers could legitimately ignore the parties' structural preferences to the
extent that those preferences produce negative externalities-such as a preference for
a discretionary hearing that the state will subsidize. On the other hand, as between an
inflexible default rule and a flexible default standard whose higher court costs the
parties are obliged entirely to bear, lawmakers should remain indifferent.
144. The general prevalence of economic risk aversion is already well documented.
See, e.g., Hirsch & Wang, supra note 43, at 31 n.117.
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[W]hile ... rules are probably cheaper to interpret if one is striving
for a precise knowledge of legal contours, it may be that standards
give individuals a less expensive way of gaining a rough idea of the
law's content. Thus, although the reasonable price default... may
be more expensive to interpret precisely than a more explicit ex ante
rule, it might give market participants a rough approximation of
damages fairly cheaply. Anyone who has tried to work through the
social security disability grids will understand that ex ante precision
may increase the costs of making rough estimates.145
This hypothesis does not hold up under analysis: Lawmakers can
always add an explanatory preamble to a complex rule, describing the
public policy that underlies it. Such a preamble appended to a rule
provides at least as much information for purposes of rough
approximation as a standard does. 46 But even assuming that Ayres's
argument is correct for the sake of discussion, if most parties would be
satisfied by a default standard which they can determine at low cost to
produce a result falling somewhere within a range around theirr¢xact
preference, then logic suggests that they would be even more satisfied
by a simple default rule, featuring similarly low information costs,
yielding (by virtue of its simplicity) a result less likely to fit
preferences exactly, but one that falls within the same range. By
comparison to a default standard, a simple default rule entails less risk
and hence will appeal to parties who are risk averse-as parties tend
typically to be.'47
Ayres's second argument follows from his insight that a non-
majoritarian default might nevertheless prove optimal by virtue of
disparate transaction costs: If the costs of writing into a contract a
minority's preferred term exceeds the costs of writing in the majority's
preferred term, then it might prove more costly in the aggregate for
the minority to opt out of a majoritarian default than vice versa.
Under these conditions, adopting the "minoritarian" default yields
cost efficiency.14
Although only a minority might prefer that a standard should
govern parties' rights under a contract, Ayres asserts, in the context of
corporate law defaults, a standard can be replicated there only at
great expense: Whereas a standard operating in default of contractual
provision can be imposed within acceptable bounds of predictability
once courts have elaborated it with precedents, a contractual standard
of the same (inexpensive) brevity is unacceptably uncertain because
145. Ayres, supra note 23, at 8 (footnotes omitted); cf. Kaplow, supra note 139, at
596-99.
146. See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code, art. II, pt. 1, general cmt. (amended 2003).
147. For a further discussion of the problem of precision of preferences, see supra
notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
148. Ayres & Gernter, supra note 2, at 93.
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linguistic variations will splinter the precedents. 149 For those (fewer)
parties who prefer the standard, the cost of folding the precedents into
the contract-or, by extension, the testamentary instrument-would
prove prohibitive.
Once again, this imaginative argument does not withstand analysis.
In the inheritance context, even benefactors who prefer a default
standard may be satisfied with a default rule that matches their
current substantive intent and hence holds out the prospect of
avoiding transaction costs entirely. As a consequence, the relevant
minority may be a small minority indeed. At any rate, even
benefactors who do choose to delegate discretion (typically to a
fiduciary-but usually for the purpose of building postmortem
flexibility into the estate plan, only after they have lost the
opportunity to exercise discretion themselves) have long acted to
diminish uncertainty by recourse to terminological conventions that
preserve and exploit bodies of precedent, transforming (mere) words
into terms of art. 5 ° The phenomenon of path dependence thus
operates to forestall the sort of doctrinal splintering that Ayres
conjectures. Why the same forces should not channel language in
other doctrinal arenas, including commercial and corporate law, is not
readily apparent.'5 '
2. The P's and Q's of Empiricism
Having said this much, we still face the problem of how to go about
determining benefactors' "probable" intent, as a prelude to
formulating inheritance defaults. Although spared having to
reconstruct hypothetical bargains, scholars who would inquire into
unilateral donative preferences still have their work cut out. The
mind of a decedent is the ultimate sanctum sanctorum. It refuses to
yield itself to view. That being so, scholars must make do with less
authoritative forms of evidence, be they decedents' relics or some sort
of survey conducted before the fact.
149. Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of
Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1391, 1403-06 (1992) (book review).
150. "The forms used herein have been taken from cases, or have been based upon
well-established legal principles. The cases cited, in many instances, give an
authoritative exposition of the terminology used.... [B]y the use of approved
terminology lawyers can reduce the possibility of litigation to a minimum." William
D. Rollison, Clauses in Wills and Forms of Wills: Annotated vi (1946); see also David
M. Becker, Broad Perspective in the Development of a Flexible Estate Plan, 63 Iowa L.
Rev. 751, 802, 814 n.102, 816-17 (1978) (observing the utility of linguistic
standardization); John Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 489, 494 (1975) (same).
151. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U.
L.Q. 347,348, 350-51 (1996).
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a. The Perils of Expertism
Existing studies have taken a variety of forms, all of which betray
weaknesses of one kind or another.152 Perhaps the most audacious
solution is the one offered by the Commissioners, who are content to
poll the Joint Editorial Board in charge of their model law, the
Uniform Probate Code. This distinguished body "counts among its
members not only leading scholars in the field but also nationally
known estate planners of considerable insight and experience," the
Reporter observes, and "[t]heir cumulative experience suggests that
they have a pretty good idea of what most clients want."' 53
Would that we could discover decedents' intent with such ease!
Alas, this ointment, advertised as a soothing remedy for the
Commissioners' dearth of funding for genuine empirical research,
1 4
contains a host of flies. One obvious difficulty is our want of
assurance that the interactions reported by a group of estate planners
will have involved a random sample of benefactors.'55 This difficulty
is, if anything, compounded by the collective prominence of the
instant group, for the more elite the practitioners, the greater the
danger that they have lost touch with the planning patterns of lower-
and middle-income benefactors who make up the bulk of the
population. 56
This difficulty to one side, any analysis based upon recollections and
impressions in lieu of statistics is prone to an assortment of cognitive
errors157 Of course, the recollections of concern to us here are those
of estate planning experts-yet psychological studies of expertise in
general confirm that it lends little or no refuge against organic
imperfections of memory and statistical judgment.'58 In this respect,
152. For prior assessments, see Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 324-26; Johnson &
Robbennolt, supra note 49, at 483-85, 490-98.
153. Waggoner, supra note 29, at 2337-38. Professor Waggoner had taken a more
agnostic view of this approach before he himself joined the Uniform Probate Code
revision project. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform
Probate Code's System for Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 626, 627 (1971) ("While this may or may not be an authoritative way of
measuring average client intent ...."). Compare also Professor Waggoner's
complaint that local deviations from the Code are "[aill too often ... the result of less
well informed persons acting on scant investigation." John H. Langbein & Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: The New Code, 55 Alb. L.
Rev. 871, 878-79 (1992).
154. Waggoner, supra note 29, at 2337.
155. Nor can we readily compensate for that lack of randomness, as we might in
connection with an actual data set. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
156. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
157. In the related context of expert medical testimony, Professor Sunstein likewise
argues that expert witnesses will be prone to excessive-optimism bias and hence are
less reliable than statistical evidence. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics,
Not Experts, 51 Duke L.J. 629 passim (2001).
158. Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making 72-73, 258
(1993); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 782-83 &
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expert and lay persons alike are essentially, inescapably, and
everlastingly human.
One mnemonic frailty documented in the psychological literature is
the tendency of persons to recall a vivid experience more readily than
the mundane. As a consequence, they tend systematically to
overestimate the frequency of unusual events because those events
leap more easily to mind.159 This tropism might lead estate planners,
by analogy, to overestimate the proportion of clients with atypical
preferences. Persons are also prone to extrapolate on the basis of
limited experience. An estate planner who has encountered only a
few clients who needed to deal with an unusual issue will often assume
that the clients' resolution or intent with respect to it is representative
of clients generally, whereas a statistician would attach less confidence
to data based on such a small sample."6  Finally, persons have a
demonstrated inclination to ascribe their own attitudes to others and
hence are apt to regard "their own behavioral choices and judgments
as relatively common and appropriate ... while viewing alternative
responses as uncommon, deviant, and inappropriate."'' 1  This
cognitive bias could compromise any assessments of a typical client's
preferences offered up by estate planners, irrespective of their
experience.
Suffice it to say, then, that the memories-or confabulations-of
estate planners represent a poor substitute for hard data. And we can
even bolster this surmise with a bit of hard data. In a study performed
nn.26-27 (2001); Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 157, at 630 & n.5; Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 23, 26-28 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty]. This might not be true of experts whose
expertise depends on, and hence by virtue of selection reflects, their memory skills or
statistical abilities. Presumably, estate planning experts require neither. See Pious,
supra, at 219-20 (reporting the findings of studies that professional oddsmakers and
other experts in statistically-sensitive areas are less subject to common statistical
fallacies); Elena L. Grigorenko, Expertise and Mental Disabilities: Bridging the
Unbridgeable?, in The Psychology of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise 156, 158-
59 (Robert J. Sternberg & Elena L. Grigorenko eds., 2003) (reporting the findings of
studies that generalized memory skills per se are not associated with expert
performance in various domains).
159. This phenomenon is known within cognitive psychology as the availability
heuristic. Pious, supra note 158, at 121-30; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in Judgment Under
Uncertainty, supra note 158, at 163.
160. This phenomenon, playfully dubbed the law of small numbers, derives from
the representativeness heuristic. Pious, supra note 158, at 112-13; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 158, at 23.
161. Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On
the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in Judgment Under
Uncertainty, supra note 158, at 129, 140. Cognitive psychologists have termed this
phenomenon false consensus bias or egocentric attribution bias. Id. at 129, 140;
Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge- What Others
Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 Psychol. Bull. 737 (1999).
2004] 1071
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in 1987, all members of a national organization of inheritance lawyers
received a questionnaire concerning donative preferences which they
were requested to present to their clients. Some did so, generating
one data set, but others simply reported "what they said their clients
wished,... based upon discussions with clients and experience over
many years." 62  When the researchers compared this second
(accidental) data set with the first one, they discovered "a striking
difference between what lawyers believe their clients want ... and
what the clients themselves want." '163 Quod erat demonstrandum.
Yet, developing a sound methodology to replace the
Commissioners' armchair empiricism is no simple matter. Studies
based on surveys of living persons provide no assurance of accuracy;
the preferences expressed therein by subjects may well be off-the-
cuff-or even disingenuous."6M And the extant studies of this sort have
sacrificed additional credibility by asking subjects to react
hypothetically to various scenarios of family circumstance posed by
the investigator.' It goes without saying that a subject's donative
intent in the abstract and in the concrete might differ markedly.
Performative intent is only assured if we confine our study to
executed wills, either of the living or of the dead. Helpfully, the dead
cannot balk at participating in such a study; probate records are public
documents and have provided the raw data for a number of empirical
investigations. 16 6 Yet, obstacles remain. Some matters resist inquiry
by reference to wills, either because wills too seldom address them,
167
or because in structural terms the act of formulating a will itself
modifies intent. Consider in this second regard the problem of
gratuitous transfers to distant relatives. Although examinations of
wills would lead us to conclude that few benefactors intend to make
such transfers,' 68 there is a ready explanation for their rarity: They are
crowded out by bequests to close relatives or, in want of these, by
unpredictable bequests to non-relatives that an inflexible scheme of
intestacy cannot reproduce. Whether a benefactor without close
162. Raymond H. Young, Meaning of "Issue" and "Descendants," 13 Am. C. Prob.
Couns. Prob. Notes 225,225-26 (1988).
163. Id. at 226.
164. Either testate or intestate subjects might falsify their preferences if those
preferences contradict a prevailing social norm, a fact which subjects might wish to
conceal from the researcher. See generally Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies
(1995).
165. See Fellows et al., supra note 49, at 722; Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 327-30;
Glucksman, supra note 131, at 267, 294. One pair of researchers limited its data set to
"responses of those persons who could easily relate to the scenario." Johnson &
Robbennolt, supra note 49, at 495; cf. id. at 496.
166. Most of the existing studies are of this type. E.g., Schneider, supra note 138, at
411-13.
167. Remote contingencies (such as the possibility of divorce) hardly ever appear
in wills, either because of transaction costs, overoptimism bias, or social taboos.
168. See infra note 225.
1072 [Vol. 73
2004] DEFAULT RULES IN INHERITANCE LAW 1073
relatives would wish to provide for distant relatives under a scheme of
intestacy is therefore a question that researchers can only resolve by
conducting a survey of intestates, however reliable that evidence may
be.
169
Even concerning issues susceptible to a study of wills, a random
sample of probate records may fail to reflect a cross-section of
benefactors, at least for the purpose of propounding default rules of
intestacy. Testate persons prove more affluent, on average, than their
intestate counterparts 7'-and the rich are different from you and
me.' 71  Statisticians can, however, compensate for the lack of
representativeness of a sample by weighting it to reflect relevant
criteria (economic and otherwise)'72  proportionately to their
numbers-a process known as stratified or quota sampling. 7 3 For a
169. For another instance in which evidence drawn from wills should prove
inconclusive, albeit for a different reason, see supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
170. See supra note 72.
171. See F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Rich Boy, in All the Sad Young Men 1, 1 (1926).
But compare Hemingway's retort: "Yes, they have more money." Ernest
Hemingway, The Snows of Kilimanjaro, in The Snows of Kilimanjaro and Other
Stories 3, 23 (1927). For another literary assertion of the cultural identity of the rich
and poor, see George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London 119-20 (Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich 1961) (1933). Although the extent to which donative preferences of
the rich and poor tend to differ has not been studied systematically, the disparate
incentive for tax planning, if nothing else, has a preference-stratifying effect. See
Shammas et al., supra note 72, at 180-91. More generally, wealth affords benefactors
greater leeway to indulge in what an economist might dub discretionary bequests, a
benevolent analogue to the consumption of luxury goods. Hence, there is some
evidence that affluent benefactors are more inclined to bequeath to persons beyond
the immediate family, and to charity. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy
and Charitable Giving 237, 244 (1985); Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 90, 111-18;
Steuart Henderson Britt, The Significance of the Last Will and Testament, 8 J. Soc.
Psychol. 347, 351-53 (1937) (presenting evidence from an early empirical study).
172. Possibly including ethnicity, among others. See Remi P. Clignet, Ethnicity and
Inheritance, in Inheritance and Wealth in America 119, 125-32 (Robert K. Miller, Jr.
& Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998); Fellows et al., supra note 49, at 734-36; cf. Britt,
supra note 171, at 352 passim (finding no evidence in an early empirical study that
testamentary patterns differ markedly on the basis of various testator characteristics).
Presumably, there is not something unique about testators per se that distinguishes
them systematically from intestates, although a statistically significant number of
benefactors may sort themselves into intestates or testators on the basis of their
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with existing intestacy law. See supra notes 28, 48.
Hence, a sample of wills may be skewed disproportionately in the direction of
contrariety. A researcher could only control for this effect by developing additional
polling data and factoring into the data set a proportional number of intentional
intestates who have not executed wills in order to carry out the scheme of distribution
that intestacy law currently provided. For a study mixing evidence from probate
records with survey evidence, see Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at
1045.
173. Richard C. Sprinthall, Basic Statistical Analysis 117-18 (3d ed. 1990). Given
that wealthy persons are likely to execute wills irrespective of the utility of an
intestacy statute, we may reasonably skew our statistical sample of wills to reflect not
a cross-section of society per se, but rather a cross-section of potential intestates-
which means we must shift the sample further toward the poor end of the
socioeconomic spectrum.
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sample of executed wills, the requisite information should be
sufficiently accessible; data on the size of decedents' estates, for
example, can be gleaned from executors' inventory and accounting
records, which accompany wills in the probate archives.'
74
b. The Meaning of Intent
Yet, the prospect of this methodology also brings to light a more
substantial theoretical question. Preferences are endogenous.'75 A
subject may begin the estate planning process with one set of
preferences and upon deliberation with, and technical guidance from,
an attorney scrivener, end with another. 76 Professionally drafted wills
reflect benefactors' informed intent. Is that the intent inheritance
defaults should strive to mimic?
This issue has surfaced only once in the inheritance literature.'77
Professor Fellows argued that, to the extent they premise the rules of
intestacy upon probable intent, lawmakers should look to informed
intent. Doing so advances the fairness objective of "[e]qual planning
under the law," by "extending... the benefits of competent estate
planning" to intestate benefactors. 78 Hence, the statutory scheme of
intestacy might provide for the creation of trusts, rather than outright
bequests, to minor children, for example. 179
Once again, default rule theory offers a useful perspective on this
problem. 8 If lawmakers align the rules of intestacy with informed
intent, and if we stipulate that informed intent differs from
174. Shammas et al., supra note 72, at 17-18. Whether a random sample of probate
records will suffice for exploring the default rules applicable to testamentary
instruments, as opposed to the rules of intestacy, again depends on the distribution of
testators who do expressly anticipate contingencies that default rules otherwise
resolve within simpler wills. Once more, we cannot overlook the possibility that wills
failing explicitly to resolve contingencies will trace on average to a poorer set of
testators whose testarfientary intent could differ systematically from wealthier
testators who execute more comprehensive wills. Hence, stratified sampling remains
important in this context.
175. See supra note 80.
176. For an advocation of the exercise of attorney influence, see John R. Price,
Price on Contemporary Estate Planning §§ 1.9, 1.31 (1st ed. 1992) (in the 1st ed. only).
For brief discussions and survey evidence of attorney influence, see Jeffrey P.
Rosenfeld, The Legacy of Aging: Inheritance and Disinheritance in Social
Perspective 18-20 (1979); Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 217-18; and Fellows et al.,
supra note 49, at 721-22. Obviously, attorney scriveners have a greater opportunity to
exercise influence over benefactors than do lawmakers, since these attorneys
participate directly in the estate planning process. Cf supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
177. See Fellows, supra note 76, at 613, 656-57; see also McGovern & Kurtz, supra
note 28, § 2.3, at 60-61 (raising, but not resolving, the issue).
178. Fellows, supra note 76, at 657; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
179. Fellows, supra note 76, at 656-57. Likewise, incompetent heirs. See Sussman et
al., supra note 28, at 189-90 (offering evidence from wills).
180. For the one extant discussion, see Charny, supra note 51, at 1820-23, 1844-47.
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uninformed intent, then the consequence will be either to encourage
the creation of homemade wills to avoid intestacy (at a modest
transaction cost) or to encourage consultation with estate planners (at
a more substantial transaction cost). Even if estate planners then
proceed to impress benefactors with the virtues of intestacy law, and
of the needlessness of a will, they will not have gained this wisdom
free of charge; indeed, the cost will more or less have equaled that of
executing a will.18 Hence, informed-intent defaults do tend to
produce inefficiency. By contrast, an intestacy law mirroring
uninformed intent minimizes transaction costs.
Contemplating the issue from the contracts side, the late Professor
David Charny observed that defaults reflecting informed intent might
serve paternalistic ends: Contracting parties who neglect to override
the default can be expected to become thankful in due course. 82 This
argument fails to bridge the categorical divide. Benefactors who defer
to a sophisticated intestacy scheme of which they (naively)
disapprove, or which they do not understand, never live to appreciate
its superiority.183  Others who instead respond by executing
homemade wills that reflect their uninformed preferences also derive
nothing from the exercise."8 Only those who happen to respond by
consulting an estate planner may come to approve a sophisticated
intestacy law, and then only after remitting the requisite fees for their
enlightenment. A priori, uninformed benefactois know they can pay
the price of becoming informed. They choose whether or not to do so
on the basis of how much they value the learning experience,
irrespective of the background state of intestacy law. Schemes of
intestacy thus should have little impact on the market for estate
planning, even assuming we found sufficient cause for paternalistic
intervention into that market."8
181. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
182. Charny, supra note 51, at 1845-47.
183. For this reason, paternalistic intervention ordinarily has no place within
inheritance policy. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 43, at 24-27.
184. This, indeed, is the rub: As a general proposition, because it wants coercion, a
paternalistic default is a doubtful means of ever enhancing the utility of an unwilling
subject. For further discussions, see Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism,"
151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1211-26, 1250-54 (2003); Charny, supra note 51, at 1847 &
n.114; Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1273-74; Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism
Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005); and Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1159, 1159-67 passim (2003).
185. Our earlier analysis of penalty defaults pertains here. See supra text
accompanying note 124. For a discussion of the problem of paternalistic interference
with markets, see John Kleinig, Paternalism 176-99 (1983). There may exist an
element of irrationality in the market for estate planning stemming from the
psychological aversion to testation, see supra Part I.C.2.c, but it is hardly clear that
encouraging participation in that market would serve strictly paternalistic ends.
Persons dragged kicking and screaming to an estate planner may or may not be
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Still, Fellows's position may be analytically defensible otherwise.
Just possibly in this one situation, an informed-intent default could
have benign didactic consequences for the uninformed. 8 6  Some
experimental evidence suggests that when subjects believe a default to
be premised on better information than theirs, signaling its
superiority, they tend to switch over to it as a preference.8 7 Whereas
benefactors have no cause to believe that anyone has better
information than they about how best to distribute their wealth, they
might be prepared to concede lawmakers' greater sophistication when
it comes to packaging bequests. Thus, a default rule creating trusts for
beneficiaries who untutored benefactors would have wanted to
provide for outright might well gain their acquiescence. Benefactors
might accept on faith an embellished version of an estate plan in
substantive accord with their wishes-as perhaps many do already
when an attorney endeavors to explain it to them. In such cases, the
default rule would serve to alter intent not for the expressivists'
imperious end of "norm management,"'88 but for the less intrusive
purpose of efficiently disseminating estate planning proficiency. If it
operates in this way, an informed-intent default will not occasion
costly opt-out activity.
Even if an informed-intent default does not operate to transform
intent, the question remains how many uninformed benefactors will
pay coin of the realm to avoid a default that defies their wishes only in
respect of its instrument of transfer, not its substance. Those (few?)
who do will produce inefficiency. Those (many?) who do not will
leave behind happier beneficiaries, profiting from a more
sophisticated estate plan. The problem then becomes one of weighing
the costs and benefits, similar to the balance we earlier considered
theoretically in connection with social defaults."8 9 There, however,
egalitarian concerns contraindicated a social default, which
discriminates against poorer benefactors. 90 Here, the opposite is true,
because an informed-intent default promotes equality of estate
planning.
If we conclude, as we reasonably may, that the default rules of
intestacy should reflect informed probable intent, then a stratified
sample of professionally drafted wills provides the best route to its
thankful after the fact for having been forced to reflect at length upon their inevitable
demise.
186. Cf. supra Part I.C.2.d.
187. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1247, 1271; Sunstein, supra note 100, at 114-16.
188. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 82, at 907.
189. See Charny, supra note 51, at 1847; supra Part I.C.2.b. Were the advantages of
the trust device to beneficiaries sufficiently great and uniform, the possibility of a
mandatory rule would also have to be contemplated here: In Great Britain, for
example, all future interests must be clothed in trust. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note
43, at 32-33.
190. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
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discovery.191 If, on the other hand, we choose to focus on uninformed
intent, yet we remain skeptical of survey evidence, then investigators
should include in the stratified sample only wills that were not
professionally drafted.192 These comprise the best available indicators
of the performative intent of typical, untutored intestates.
II. INHERITANCE DEFAULTS IN PRACTICE
So much for our theory. We are safe in saying that it has never
been put into anything remotely approaching rigorous practice. To
the extent that existing inheritance defaults aim at effectuating
probable intent, lawmakers have derived those probabilities almost
entirely from inference, if not arbitrary guesswork. 93 Even the
default rules established in the Uniform Probate Code-for better or
worse, a cynosure for local drafters 94-lack a reliable foundation in
empirical evidence.1 95 Reconsideration of the compendium of existing
inheritance defaults from a majoritarian perspective thus becomes a
tall order, which we cannot expect lawmakers anywhere to undertake
anytime soon-even if we may hold out hope that they will eventually
get around to it somewhere, sometime. Be that as it may, the analysis
presented up to now can still have immediate, practical significance
for our law. So long as we do not allow the best to be the enemy of
the good, we need not dismiss the last many pages as so much
recherch idealizing.
The key is to lay out some priorities. We can identify a number of
inheritance defaults that appear likely candidates for revision under a
191. In advocating informed intent as the appropriate standard for intestacy
defaults, Professor Fellows distinguishes between common testamentary provisions
resulting from attorneys' "helpful" estate planning influence and other common
provisions that "are based more on custom within the legal profession than on good
legal reasons." Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 325. Whereas lawmakers should
incorporate the first sort into intestacy law, they should screen out the second sort
"[t]o the extent that such provisions can be detected .... " Id. Fellows failed to
explain how lawmakers should go about distinguishing the two sorts of attorney-
inspired provisions.
192. For a British study of the frequency of homemade wills (which unsurprisingly
are more common among poorer benefactors), see Finch et al., supra note 72, at 45-
46.
193. See Model Probate Code, supra note 12, § 22 cmt. ("[A]ny scheme of intestate
succession is, to some extent, arbitrary. It should in the main express what the typical
intestate would have wished.... This is a highly speculative matter .. "). Professor
Lawrence Friedman maintains that in practice rules of intestacy are "imposed for
social rather than individualistic reasons." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the
Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 340,
355; see also In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000) ("Among the fifty
states, the [intestacy] statutes are widely disparate, and many of the provisions were
drafted over one hundred years ago." (citation omitted)).
194. See generally Roger W. Anderson, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code
in Nonadopting States, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 599 (1985).
195. Only a few of the Code's defaults are premised on empirical evidence. See
infra note 213; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
majoritarian-default model. And we can identify a few defaults that
almost certainly contravene that model. Even if, then, lawmakers put
off the thorough review of inheritance defaults that the field requires,
they can begin to take on bits and pieces of that task where it is most
apt to bear fruit. Accordingly, our final project shall be to assist
lawmakers in setting a research agenda for inheritance defaults.
A. Structural Attributes
To the extent that the model of inheritance defaults developed in
this Article speaks to the matter of their structural form, we can offer
immediate criticisms and recommendations that require little or no
confirmation in empirical research.
Some inheritance defaults have always been complicated.196
Perversely, the Code has operated in quite a few instances to enhance
their complexity,'97 and the drafters of the Code even plead guilty
(without remorse) to the charge. Their commentary merits
examination, for it throws a flood of light on one influential approach
to crafting inheritance defaults.
Addressing the Code's provisions on antilapse, 98 a default rule of
construction applicable to wills, the drafters avowed that "we do not
deny the intricacy of the statutory scheme." '19 9 They continued:
The terms of the statutes are elaborate and intricate, however,
because they have to deal with a variety of potentially complicated
factual situations.... [T~he test of a statute is not whether it is
understandable upon a single reading of its text. The test is whether
the statute produces a clear and appropriate result when applied to
actual cases.... If, by working with the statutory language and the
official comments for a few hours, a lawyer (or probate judge) can
resolve the case, the public is much better served.., than it would
be by a simpler statute that leaves ... issues unresolved and
[perhaps] requires.., lengthy litigation.., in order to resolve the
case.
2
Of course, the drafters are correct to conclude that a comprehensive
default rule, filling gaps in an instrument, is superior to a rule that
itself contains gaps. But that represents a false dichotomy. The real
issue is whether a complex and comprehensive default outperforms a
simple and comprehensive default. Here, we need to recall that the
196. Intestate division among collateral kindred provides one obvious example. See
A.W.B. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law 59-63 (2d ed.
1986). On lawmakers' tropism for legal complexity in general, see Adam J. Hirsch,
Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1349 & n.79 (2003).
197. See Ascher, supra note 20, at 639-43 passim.
198. Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-603, 2-706 (amended 2003). On the problem of lapse
and antilapse, see supra note 20.
199. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New
Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1091, 1148 (1992).
200. Id.; see also id. at 1124.
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cost efficiency of an inheritance default stems not from the
opportunity to produce wills more economically; no experienced
estate planner drafts in reliance on inheritance defaults.2°1 Rather, the
benefit flows from avoiding the very need for professional
assistance-either at all (i.e., intestacy) or after events (such as an
unanticipated lapse) render an existing will obsolescent. Assuming
that a more complicated inheritance default negates the need for such
assistance more often, it is superior-but not if the benefactor must
employ counsel simply to comprehend what the default rule is; then
the opportunity to save disappears. The drafters of the Code ought to
have asked themselves whether a lay person, not an attorney or a
judge, "working... for a few hours," could master their inheritance
defaults.2°  Quite possibly, the answer is no. State legislators,
contemplating their existing inheritance defaults, ought to ask
themselves the same question.
On the matter of discretion within the regime of inheritance
defaults, the Commissioners again leave themselves open to criticism.
Few states, apart from those that have adopted the Code, currently
provide any default standards, and extrinsic evidence pertaining to
intent is consistently inadmissible; inheritance defaults operate
mechanically and hence with predictability. For reasons already
discussed, this approach appears sound.2"3 The Commissioners,
however, have broken with this tradition, sprinkling elements of
discretion into their inheritance defaults, and rather haphazardly at
that.
As regards the default rules of intestacy, the Code's rules continue
to operate mechanically.2° Yet, as regards the principal default rules
applicable to wills-antilapse, ademption, and related doctrines-the
Code admits extrinsic evidence to override its default rules.205
Another trio of default rules pertains to the implied effect of
marriage, childbirth, and divorce on an antecedent estate plan. With
respect to marriage, the Code's default rule bows to certain types of
201. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying note 200. This concern also bears on several of
the criticisms of existing inheritance defaults presented infra Part II.B. To the extent
we can identify refinements of an inheritance default that would better serve to
effectuate probable intent, we must still weigh their virtues against the damage they
do to the law's accessibility to lay persons. The game is not necessarily worth the
candle.
203. See supra Part I.D.l.c.
204. The Commissioners had considered but rejected the possibility of injecting
discretion into the scheme of intestacy. Richard V. Wellman, Arkansas and the
Uniform Probate Code: Some Issues and Answers, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 1, 3
(1979).
205. Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-601, 2-701 (amended 2003); cf id. §§ 3-902(b), 3-9A-




extrinsic evidence;" 6 with respect to childbirth, a more limited range
of extrinsic evidence is admissible;20 7 and with respect to divorce, no
extrinsic evidence is admissible."' The degree of explicitness and
level of proof necessary to override a default rule also vary under the
Code.2" 9
In only one instance do the Commissioners offer any sort of
justification for these seemingly arbitrary structural choices. As
concerns the decision to admit extrinsic evidence in connection with
antilapse and ademption," ° the Commissioners defend their rule with
the (utterly preposterous) claim that it "align[s] the statutory rules of
construction.., with those established at common law." '211 Like prior
statutory law, the common law established no such precedent,2"2 and
default rule theory suggests that we ought not set one now. State
legislators already operating under the Code should consider
expunging all of its discretionary intrusions into their default regimes.
B. Substantive Attributes
When we proceed to inspect the substance of inheritance defaults,
we find that the Commissioners, along with other lawmakers, have
displayed at least a velleity toward intent effectuation. Preexisting
empirical studies figured in the design of a few of the Code's default
rules, and others are premised on unsubstantiated inferences
(however accurate) about probable intent.2"3 Nevertheless, neither
206. Id. § 2-301(a)(1), (a)(3).
207. Id. § 2-302(b)(2).
208. Id. § 2-804(b).
209. Compare id. § 3-902(b) (granting the court discretion to deviate from a default
rule apportioning estate debts among beneficiaries to carry out the testator's "express
or implied purpose," given the "testamentary plan"), with id. § 3-9A-103(a) (giving
effect only to a testamentary provision that "expressly and unambiguously directs"
deviation from a default rule apportioning estate taxes among beneficiaries).
Although the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily applies, in a few
instances the Code requires clear and convincing evidence to override a default rule.
Id. §§ 2-507(c)-(d) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to deviate from the
default rules determining how subsequent testamentary instruments should be read in
pari materia with prior instruments); see also Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing
Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between Formality
and Adjudicative Justice, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 453 (2002) (criticizing the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence anywhere within inheritance law).
210. See supra note 205.
211. Unif. Probate Code § 2-601 cmt. (amended 2003). The Commissioners cite no
cases to substantiate this ahistorical pronouncement. That an error of this magnitude
could find its way into the Code's official commentary is surprising and even a bit
troubling. Cf Hirsch, supra note 6, at 185-86.
212. For common law doctrine, see 6 Page, supra note 59, §§ 50.1-.2, 50.14-20,
52.16, 54.1, 54.3-54.5, 54.14-.15; Hirsch, supra note 20, at 1128-30.
213. See Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-102 cmt., 2-106 cmt., 2-302 cmt. (amended 2003)
(citing to empirical studies); id. §§ 2-109 cmt., 2-301 cmt., 2-705 cmt., 2-804 cmt., 3-902
cmt. (inferring intent); cf. id. § 2-507 cmt. (defending a default rule as "workable" and
based on "common-sense"); id. § 2-509 cmt. (defending a default rule premised on
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the Commissioners nor any state legislature has mandated an
informed scheme of default rules of the sort that Professor Fellows
advocates;214 thus, intestacy law nowhere provides by implication for
the creation of trusts. 15 In this respect, American law contrasts with
longstanding British law, whose rules of intestacy do clothe certain
distributions in "statutory trust., 216 What is more, several significant
rules of intestacy are manifestly out of step with a majoritarian
approach to inheritance defaults of either the informed or uninformed
variety.217
Consider the treatment of intestate succession in the absence of
close relatives. Following a longstanding principle, if no heirs claim an
intestate estate, then propter defectum sanguinis it escheats to the
state.218 State statutes traditionally allowed distant relatives to take as
heirs, so long as they could be found (or presented themselves). The
Code, however, confines heirship to the second collateral line, thereby
legalities that "the testator understood or should have understood"); id. § 2-607 cmt.
(offering no rationale for a default rule that "abolished" the preceding common law
rule); id. § 2-608 cmt. (defending a default rule because it "seems better"); id. § 3-9A-
104 cmt. (defending a default rule because the alternative would be "harsh"); see also
supra note 20.
214. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
215. See Unif. Probate Code art. II, pt. 1 (amended 2003). One of the Codes's
default rules applicable to wills was inspired by the aim of extending to the testator
the benefits of expert estate planning, although whether the Commissioners' rule
serves to achieve that end remains a matter of controversy. Id. § 2-707 & cmt.,
(construing remainder interests to be contingent on surviving to the time when they
become possessory); Waggoner, supra note 29, at 2310 passim; cf Becker, supra note
29, at 369-70 passim; Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law
of Remainders, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 148, 163-65 passim (1995).
216. Clive V. Margrave-Jones, Mellows: The Law of Succession §§ 12.11, 12.23-.25
(5th ed. 1993). These rules parallel "what most intestates would have done if a well-
drawn will had been prepared for them." Joseph Warren, The Law of Property Act,
1922, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 245, 265 (1923).
217. Another issue peculiarly apposite to the setting of default rules within
Uniform Acts is their generalizability. To the extent that comparative analysis of
local empirical data demonstrates sharply divergent patterns of donative intent,
nonharmonious rules will be superior to uniform rules. The Commissioners should
steer clear of default rules covering any such matter. See Hirsch, supra note 6, at 157.
For a related discussion, see Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract
Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1033, 1051-56.
218. For historical background, see 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England *302 (1765-1769); 2 id. *72-73, *244-57, *494-95. There is some
evidence that escheat was once considered abusive; at least it was sufficiently
unpopular that the early settlers of Massachusetts Bay took the opportunity of
colonization to abolish escheat altogether. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 10
(1641), reprinted in Puritan Political Ideas, 1558-1794, at 177, 181 (Edmund S. Morgan
ed., 1965). It is unclear what the settlers contemplated would happen to property for
whom no heir could be found; at any rate, within seven years the doctrine of escheat
reappeared in colonial Massachusetts. The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts 21
(photo. reprint, Max Farrand ed., 1929) (1648).
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broadening somewhat the range of estates that lie vulnerable to
escheat. This approach has proven influential among the states. 19
The default rule of escheat is not premised on intent effectuation.
Escheat began as one of the feudal incidents, and lawmakers continue
to conceptualize it as a revenue measure. 220  The Reporter for the
original Code endorsed this policy and defended the extension of
the parameters of escheat on another ground: Inheritance by remote
relatives "aligns with no expectation" on their part.22 As an earlier
scholar cited by the Reporter had elaborated more graphically, distant
relatives comprise "laughing heirs," persons "who suffer no sense of
bereavement" at the decedent's loss and for whom the inheritance
constitutes an "undeserved windfall. ' 223  Thus rationalized, escheat
comprises a social default.2 4
219. This rule appeared in the original Code of 1969 and was carried forward into
the revised Code of 1990. Unif. Probate Code § 2-103(4), 2-105 (amended 2003); id.
§§ 2-103(4), 2-105, 8 U.L.A. 276, 282 (1998) (pre-1990 version of article II). Although
the Commissioners did not spearhead the limitation of heirship in the United States,
many states have since adopted similar legislation. Martin L. Fried, The Uniform
Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 927, 934 n.36
(1992); see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.4
statutory notes 4-6 (1999) [hereinafter Restatement]. Great Britain has had such
legislation in place since 1925. Margrave-Jones, supra note 216, §§ 12.38, 12.41.
220. "The purpose of all escheat laws is not only to enrich the state but to put in
active use funds that are unclaimed and lying dormant." New Jersey v. Elsinore Shore
Assocs., 592 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); see also, e.g., Browder,
supra note 31, at 1312. For an early theoretical discussion, see Jeremy Bentham,
Supply Without Burden; or Escheat Vice Taxation, in 2 Works, supra note 138, at 585
(1795). See also Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 Works, supra note 138, at
336. Some lawmakers and commentators have justified this rule as compensating for
the state support that intestates lacking close relatives often received during life. See
38 U.S.C.A. § 8520(a) (2002) (providing that the personal property of veterans and
their families who die in a veterans facility that would escheat under state law goes
instead to a federal trust fund supporting veterans facilities); Md. Code Ann., Est. &
Trusts § 3-105(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2001) (providing that escheated estates go to the state
Medical Assistance Program if the decedent was a recipient of long-term care under
the program, and otherwise to education); Estate of Jurek, 428 N.W.2d 774, 777
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Rosenfeld, supra note 176, at 14-15; Averill & Brantley, supra
note 12, at 647. On the other hand, this policy is vulnerable to criticism as a form of
regressive taxation.
221. In the context of intestates without close relatives, the Reporter for the
original Code approved "the policy of directing undevised assets to public needs."
Richard V. Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. I11. L. F. 536,
537.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see also David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the
"Laughing Heir," 20 Iowa L. Rev. 203, 208-09 (1935) (also decrying inheritance by
distant relatives as a "social injustice").
224. See supra Part I.C.2; see also supra notes 54, 114-17, 125-26 and accompanying
text. In addition, Commissioners have argued that restricting the range of intestate
beneficiaries "eliminates will contests" they would otherwise have standing to bring.
Unif. Probate Code art. II, pt. 1, cmt. (amended 2003), 8 U.L.A. 271 (1998) (pre-1990
version of article II); Richard V. Wellman, Response of the Joint Editorial Board for
the Uniform Probate Code to the State Bar of California's "The Uniform Probate
Code: Analysis and Critique" 5-6 (1974); see also Cavers, supra note 223, at 209-10.
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Could the default rule of escheat simultaneously be justified in
majoritarian terms? Possibly so, at least as regards the scope of the
doctrine. How far out along the branches of a family tree the majority
of benefactors would wish to clamber in search of blood relatives is
difficult to predict. The range of persons' family ties-the ken of their
kin-varies a great deal, but it is entirely possible that empirical
evidence would confirm the typical benefactor's preference to exclude
second cousins.225 On the other hand, substituting the state for heirs of
the blood surely carries out the wishes of virtually no benefactors. 26
This much we can deduce from an abundance of empirical evidence. 27
Even considered on its own terms, the ostensible aim of avoiding will contests appears
a dubious one: Surely, someone ought to have standing and incentive to monitor and
challenge the validity of a doubtful will.
225. See generally David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account
(2nd ed. 1980). For a sociobiological perspective on inheritance by distant relatives,
suggesting that blood is not invariably thicker than water even from the perspective of
the selfish gene, see John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers,
76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216, 255-58 (1981). The extant studies suggest that, in the absence
of a nuclear family, testators may provide for the first collateral line (siblings,
nephews and nieces, etc.) under their wills, but rarely for the second collateral line
(first cousins, etc.)-thus implying that the scope of heirship under the Code may still
be too broad under a majoritarian approach to inheritance defaults. For the most
recent empirical study, citing in turn to earlier ones, see Schneider, supra note 138, at
432-37. More investigation is necessary, however, to determine what preferences
concerning the scope of heirship obtain when, because she is intestate, the benefactor
cannot select an alternative beneficiary herself but instead can only substitute for
blood relatives either (1) a consortium of charities, or (2) a discretionary distribution
made by the probate court intended to reconstruct her probable intent, as discussed
hereinafter. Here, evidence drawn from wills fails us, so we must instead have
recourse to survey evidence. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
226. For implicit recognitions of this fact by lawmakers, see Ga. Code Ann. § 53-2-
8 (1997) (avoiding distributions from an intestate to a surviving spouse who also dies
intestate within the next six months, if the property would then escheat); Tex. Prob.
Code Ann. § 47(a) (Vernon 2003) (requiring heirs to survive the intestate by 120
hours unless this condition would cause the intestate's property to escheat); Jackson v.
Schultz, 151 A.2d 284, 285-86 (Del. Ch. 1959) (construing a will to avoid escheat). But
cf. Model Probate Code, supra note 12, § 22 cmt. ("Relatives may be so distant that
the decedent might well prefer that his property go to the state rather than to such
relatives."); Atkinson, supra note 7, at 196.
227. Empirical studies of the elasticity of giving indicate that the propensity to
donate or bequeath to charity responds strongly to tax deductibility. Clotfelter, supra
note 171, at 222-52 passim; Shammas et al., supra note 72, at 180-84; Gerald E. Auten
et al., Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 Am.
Econ. Rev. 371 (2002); Michael J. Boskin, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests, 5
J. Pub. Econ. 27 (1976); David Joulfaian, Charitable Bequests and Estate Taxes, 44
Nat'l Tax J. 169 (1991). Hence, we can infer that persons prefer to donate to charity
than "donate" to government. For attitudinal data demonstrating widespread distrust
of government as a substitute provider of support for charitable causes, see Francie
Ostrower, Why the Wealthy Give 114-16 (1995). Statistical data from tax returns
shows that something less than 12.6% of all charitable gifts and bequests went to
governmental entities in 2002. AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, Giving USA 2003:
The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2002, at 7, 10 (2003). Of course,
history affords some celebrated counterexamples. See William J. Rhees, James
Smithson and His Bequest (1880); supra note 117.
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In the absence of close relatives, most testators bequeath their
estates either to friends or charities or a combination of the two.228
Friends cannot be brought within the rubric of a default rule without
creating the sort of discretionary regime that we earlier predicted
most benefactors would reject due to its uncertainty.229 A default rule
under which escheated property goes to a defined consortium of
charities would probably appeal to a larger number of benefactors, a
narrow point that we could again test empirically.23 Even if the
doctrine of escheat only applies to a handful of decedents, with a
handful of money,23' it is a rule that demands majoritarian reform.
The "laughing heir" comprises just one subset of a larger
stigmatized category, the "unworthy heir," '232 which in additional ways
has left a social imprint on the Code and many state statutes.
Consider the Code's widely-adopted default rule governing
inheritance by a decedent's parent. A parent can inherit by intestacy
from a child only if the parent has "openly treated the child as his [or
hers], and has not refused to support the child." '33  Although the
228. See Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 111-20; Browder, supra note 31, at 1312-
15; Schneider, supra note 138, at 435; see also Contemporary Studies Project, supra
note 28, at 1119 (survey evidence); Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Bequests from Resident to
Resident: Inheritance in a Retirement Community, 19 The Gerontologist 594 (1979);
Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Old Age, New Beneficiaries: Kinship, Friendship, and
(Dis)inheritance, 64 Sociology & Soc. Res. 86 (1979). That benefactors often
substitute kith for absent kin corresponds with the sociological theory of the "open"
or "wider" family, whereby persons ostensibly "create their own relatives as needed,"
who thereby "fill in for missing ... kin." Barbara H. Settles, A Perspective on
Tomorrow's Families, in Handbook of Marriage and the Family 157, 160 (Marvin B.
Sussman & Suzanne K. Steinmentz eds., 1st ed. 1987) (in the 1st ed. only); see
generally Teresa D. Marciano, Families Wider than Kin or Marriage, 1 Fam. Sci. Rev.
115 (1988); Teresa Marciano & Marvin B. Sussman, Wider Families: An Overview, in
Teresa D. Marciano & Marvin B. Sussman, Wider Families: New Traditional Family
Forms 1 (1991).
229. See supra Part I.D.l.c.
230. Here we must again rely on survey evidence. See supra notes 167-69 and
accompanying text. Neither type of escheat statute is unprecedented. Under the law
of some states, escheated estates go to the county board of education. Ga. Code Ann.
§ 53-2-51(c) (Supp. 2004); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 3-105(2)(ii) (2001); see also
supra note 220. In North Carolina, escheated estates go to provide loans for students
at the state universities. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 116B-5, 116B-7 (Supp. 2002). Under the
law of Great Britain, the Crown may at its discretion distribute an escheated estate to
dependents or friends of the decedent. Margrave-Jones, supra note 216, § 12.41. For
earlier American proposals along one or the other of these lines, see Richard T. Ely,
Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth 423 (1914);
Atkinson, supra note 7, at 196; Cavers, supra note 223, at 210-11; Fratcher, supra note
12, at 1050.
231. For a discussion of the social setting of escheat, see Rosenfeld, supra note 176,
at 99-108.
232. Atkinson, supra note 61, § 37, at 147. The best-known unworthy heir is the
slayer of the beneficiary, but there the applicable public policy against inheritance is
so strong as to have inspired a mandatory (rather than a default) rule. See McGovern
& Kurtz, supra note 28, § 2.7, at 75-77 & n.21.
233. Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(c) (amended 2003); see also Restatement, supra
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Commissioners neglected to articulate their rationale(s) for this
provision,234 courts and commentators have explained equivalent state
statutes as serving to prevent injustice,235 and/or to encourage parental
responsibility, 23 6 and/or to effectuate the probable intent of the
decedent child.237
Only the last of these justifications fits into a majoritarian-default
model.238  Does the Code's provision reflect exclusive fidelity to
probable intent? On the one hand, the Commissioners might infer
that most children, once competent to execute a will, would prefer not
to provide for a parent who had abandoned them239-an inference
which nonetheless needs empirical verification, lest the intuitions of
unabandoned Commissioners fail to coincide with the psychology of
those who have actually suffered the experience.24 °
note 219, § 2.5(5) & cmt. m, statutory notes 2, 14, reporter's note 9 (1999); Unif.
Probate Code. § 2-109 (amended 2003), 8 U.L.A. 284 (1998) (pre-1990 version of
article 1I) (similar provision restricted to fathers). For additional statutory references,
see Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044, 1048 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (petition for
certiorari). This rule applies to inheritance both from a minor child (for whom it is a
mandatory rule, since minor children cannot execute wills) and from an adult child
(for whom it is a default rule). See In re Estate of Lunsford, 547 S.E.2d 483, 486-87,
488-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), vacated by 556 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. 2001); Unif. Probate
Code §§ 1-201(5), (29), 2-114(c) cmt., 2-501 (amended 2003). One glitch in the Code's
provision is that it applies only to an abandoning "natural" parent, hence not to an
abandoning adoptive parent, a pointless and presumably accidental limitation. Unif.
Probate Code § 2-114(c) (amended 2003). Although this drafting error was identified
a decade ago, the Commissioners have never corrected it. Anne-Marie E. Rhodes,
Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 27 Ind.
L. Rev. 517, 536-37 (1994).
234. The accompanying comment and the Commissioners' scholarly commentary
are silent on the matter. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-114 cmt. (amended 2003); id .§ 2-
109 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 284-85 (1998) (pre-1990 version of article II).
235. In re Estate of Patterson, 798 So. 2d 347, 351 (Miss. 2001); McKinney v.
Richitelli, 586 S.E.2d 258, 263 (N.C. 2003); King v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 793,
795-96 (Va. 1980); Atkinson, supra note 61, § 37, at 148; Monopoli, supra note 6, at
264, 267; Rhodes, supra note 233, at 537.
236. Rainey v. Chever, 510 S.E.2d 823, 824 (Ga. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1044
(1999); McKinney, 586 S.E.2d at 263.
237. Estate of Griswold, 24 P.3d 1191, 1195-96, 1204 (Cal. 2001); Estate of Hicks,
675 N.E.2d 89, 93-95 (Ill. 1996); King, 269 S.E.2d at 795; Rhodes, supra note 233, at
520.
238. Along with substantive intent effectuation, the problem of definitional
objectivity arises here. Unless abandonment is sharply defined, a default rule
contingent upon the concept will occasion costly litigation that most benefactors (by
hypothesis) would prefer to avoid. See supra Part I.D.l.c. The Code's language,
permitting a parent to inherit so long as he or she "has openly treated the child as his
[or hers], and has not refused to support the child," does not quite qualify as a sharp
definition. Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(c) & cmt. (amended 2003).
239. See King, 269 S.E.2d at 795 ("It is reasonable to assume .... ); see also supra
note 237.
240. See Monopoli, supra note 6, at 277 (questioning the inference in connection
with minor children). As a general proposition, emotional bonds tend to be mutual.
For a recent review of the social psychology of attachment, see Mario Mikulincer et
al., Attachment Theory and Affect Regulation: The Dynamics, Development, and
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On the other hand, notice that this rule operates in a unilateral, not
a reciprocal, manner. When an abandoning parent is the first to die,
his or her abandoned child can inherit as an intestate heir under the
Code.241 Yet, even more directly, Commissioners could infer from the
parent's lifetime decision a preference not to provide for the child at
death either.242 Manifestly, if implicitly, this second side of the
existing rule follows from the social equity of the child's position, here
contradicting and superseding, instead of reinforcing, presumptive
intent.243 To be sure, abandoned children arouse our sympathy, and
lawmakers could consider creating a mandatory rule of filial
inheritance.244 Framed as a social default, however, and viewed
dispassionately, the rule appears ineffectual and even inequitable: It
forces a majority of affected benefactors to expend resources
unnecessarily in order to opt out of the default; and it discriminates
against poorer benefactors who can ill afford to do so. Conversely,
those with the means to be mean will promptly disinherit unloved
heirs.245
In a word, default rule theory demands that we jettison the very
concept of the unworthy heir and replace it with the unintended heir.
A number of the central provisions of modern intestacy law also
invite empirical scrutiny. Every current state probate code, including
the Uniform Probate Code, divides estates co-equally among children
of the benefactor.246 We have no reason to question this general
framework: A raft of studies all indicate that, by a wide margin, most
benefactors approve, irrespective of their children's relative needs or
means (or gender).247 Yet, it bears investigating whether discrete
Cognitive Consequences of Attachment-Related Strategies, 27 Motivation & Emotion
77 (2003).
241. Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-114(c), 2-705 cmt (amended 2003).
242. For an anecdotal illustration, see Goff v. Goff, 179 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo.
1944).
243. See McGovern & Kurtz, supra note 28, § 2.9, at 97 ("[Plarents who challenge a
statute which bars them from inheriting have a less appealing case than a child who
seeks to inherit from a parent.").
244. Such a rule exists in many countries and has been proposed on occasion in the
United States. For a recent discussion, see Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the
American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 1; see also
supra note 232.
245. This same analysis (preferably after empirical verification) could also be
applied to support a reciprocal default rule of disinheritance when a child "abandons"
a parent: from the perspective of intent effectuation, it seems unlikely to matter who
abandons whom. For a judicial recognition of this issue, see In re Estate of Patterson,
798 So. 2d 347, 352 (Miss. 2001). For an anecdotal illustration of disinheritance under
these conditions, see Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 98. What abandonment (or,
more aptly, estrangement) entails in this regard would again require objective
definition to forestall litigation. The Code makes no provision for this contingency,
however. Cf. infra note 274 (pointing out analogous spousal abandonment statutes).
246. Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-103(1), 2-106(b) (amended 2003). The Code "always
provides equal shares to those equally related." Id. § 2-106 cmt.
247. For empirical studies, see Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 96-102; Britt, supra
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exceptions to this pattern occur systematically. Do insolvent children
(or other heirs, for that matter) typically receive the same shares as
others? Lest they bequeath, in effect, to creditors, benefactors have
an incentive in such instances either to divert the inheritance to a
close relative of the insolvent or (in a well-planned estate) to shield
the inheritance in a spendthrift trust.248 Similarly, are institutionalized
or disabled children ordinarily treated no differently from others?
Those eligible to receive state support could lose it as a result of the
inheritance; benefactors may prefer either to divert such an
inheritance or to place it in a special-needs trust.249 (On the other
hand, query whether disabled children ineligible to receive state
support tend systematically to receive larger inheritances, to take into
account the costs of their institutional care.)50
And consider the treatment of adopted children: For purposes of
intestate succession, the Code provides that adopted children become
members of the adoptive family (including the extended family), but
note 171, at 351; Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1102; Fellows et al.,
supra note 49, at 736-37; Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 368-70; Debra S. Judge &
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Close Kin:
Inheritance in Sacramento, California, 1890-1984, 13 Ethology & Sociobiology 495,
510-16, 518 (1992); Paul L. Menchik, Primogeniture, Equal Sharing, and the U.S.
Distribution of Wealth, 94 Q.J. Econ. 299, 310, 314-15 (1980); Paul L. Menchik,
Unequal Estate Division: Is it Altruism, Reverse Bequest, or Simple Noise?, in
Modelling the Accumulation and Distribution of Wealth 105, 111-12 (Denis Kessler
& Andrd Masson eds., 1988) [hereinafter Menchik, Unequal]; Schneider, supra note
138, at 425; and Mark 0. Wilhelm, Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings:
Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 874, 880 (1996). Cf.
Dunham, supra note 54, at 253-54 (finding, in an older study, a smaller tendency
toward equality with no clear pattern of variation); Nigel Tomes, The Family,
Inheritance, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 928
(1981) (finding a smaller tendency toward equality than other recent studies, using
data disputed in Menchik, Unequal, supra, at 109-10). For a historical study, see
Shammas et al., supra note 72, at 42-47, 108-12, 202-04. For a theoretical analysis and
explanation of the tendency toward equalization, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Sergei
Severinov, Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle, 111 J.
Pol. Econ. 733, 735 (2003). For practical discussions, see L.F. Gianelli, Treating
Children Equally: Estate Planning for the Family Business or Farm, Prob. & Prop.,
Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 12, 12-13; and Schneider, supra note 138, at 427.
248. For a discussion in a related context, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and
Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45 Hastings L.J. 175, 235-39 (1994).
For an anecdotal example, see Hirsch, supra note 6, at 157 n.224. For empirical
evidence on the frequency with which spendthrift trusts appear in wills (but without
exploring the circumstances), see Browder, supra note 31, at 1331-32.
249. For a recent discussion, see Kristen Lewis Denzinger, Special Needs Trusts,
Prob. & Prop., May-June 2003, at 11.
250. For some preliminary findings on this question, see Sussman et al., supra note
28, at 101; and Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 28, at 1125-26. Query also
whether adult children who live with (or close to) a benefactor parent in old age are
favored systematically, in return for the care they can thereby provide the parent,
over adult children who live at a distance from the parent. For preliminary findings,
see Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 98-100, 118-20; Contemporary Studies Project,
supra note 28, at 1126-29. See also Finch et al., supra note 72, at 114-17 (reporting
findings of a British study).
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are simultaneously detached from the natural family.251 Although the
official commentary accompanying the Code offers no justification for
this as-of-now ubiquitous rule, the Reporter for the original Code
asserts that it stemmed from a social concern: Whereas one critic had
argued that "innocent" adoptees should continue to inherit from the
natural family, "[t]he committees shaping the Uniform Probate Code
preferred the argument that adopted children should be fully
transplanted into adopting families so that they may be raised in the
belief that they belong there." '252
Even if the Commissioners' decision to frame this default rule
according to social policy is objectionable per se,253 the rule may
qualify as a majoritarian default. Yet, the issue cries out for empirical
investigation, for in the years since the Code appeared the practices of
adoption have undergone profound change in the United States. 4
The system of confidentiality that predominated through the 1970s,
denying natural parents and adopted children any right to information
concerning the other, and thereby walling them off sociologically, now
coexists with regimes of so-called "open" adoption under which
parties share information, either directly or through the adoption
agency as intermediary. Following an open adoption, natural parents
and adopted children retain threads of knowledge and even have the
opportunity to build relationships; accordingly, the possibility that a
majority of natural parents participating in an open adoption would
prefer to bequeath to adopted children-and vice versa?-cannot be
dismissed. 5
251. Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(b) & cmt. (amended 2003); see also Restatement,
supra note 219, § 2.5(2)(A), cmt. e, statutory notes 2, 7-8, reporter's note 4 (1999).
252. Wellman, supra note 221, at 538; see also In re Estate of Fleming, 21 P.3d 281,
285-86 (Wash. 2001) (articulating this social concern as the "legislative objective"
underlying the state's analogous intestacy statute); Unif. Adoption Act § 14 cmt.
(amended 1971), 9 U.L.A. 199 (1999) (1969 Revised Act) (justifying termination of
rights of intestate inheritance from the natural parents on the additional social ground
that doing so "preserves the secrecy of adoption proceedings... by reducing the
selfish reasons an individual might have to discover his antecedents."); William L.
Eagleton, Introduction to the Intestacy Act and the Dower Rights Acts, 20 Iowa L. Rev.
241, 257-58 (1935) (defending a precursor to the Code's provision in similar terms).
253. Even considered on its own terms, this social policy- reflecting conventional
wisdom once upon a time-is controversial today. See Harold D. Grotevant & Ruth
G. McRoy, Openness in Adoption 52-63, 83-105 (1998); Judith S. Modell, A Sealed
and Secret Kinship 33-40, 62-66 (2002); Katarina Wegar, Adoption, Identity, and
Kinship 25-35 (1997).
254. The Code (including this rule) made its debut in 1969. Unif. Probate Code § 2-
109(1) (amended 2003), 8 U.L.A. 284 (1998) (pre-1990 version of article II). Nor is
this the first moment in American history when adoption practices have gone through
transition, raising questions about the obsolescence of intestacy law. For an earlier
assertion that intestacy statutes had failed to keep up with evolving social practices of
adoption, see Fred L. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child,
28 Wash. U. L.Q. 221, 244-49 (1943).
255. By 1993, the vast majority of adoption agencies offered some form or forms of
open adoption as an option. See Grotevant & McRoy, supra note 253, at 32. On the
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Be this as it may, the Code's rule is in at least one respect256
transition in adoption practices, see id. at 11, 25-34. For a discussion of the legal
history of adoption in the United States, see Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the
Real Thing?, 52 Duke L.J. 1077 (2003). For sociological discussions, see Judith S.
Modell, Kinship With Strangers 144, 163-68 (1994); and Modell, supra note 253, at 49-
54, 56-62, 65-66. Although empirical evidence demonstrates the propensity of
adoptive parents to bequeath to adopted children, no statistics on the frequency with
which kindred of the adoptive parents or members the natural family wish to benefit
adopted children, and vice versa, are extant. See Contemporary Studies Project, supra
note 28, at 1104-05, 1141; Judge & Hrdy, supra note 247, at 516-17, 519. Judges from
different eras have drawn different conclusions. Compare Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 I11.
26, 35 (1881) (inferring without evidence that kindred of adoptive parents would not
wish to bequeath to an adopted child), with MacCallum v. Seymour, 686 A.2d 935, 940
(Vt. 1996) (doubting that presumption). For a hypothesis explaining intent to provide
for adopted children grounded in behavioral biology, see Beckstrom, supra note 225,
at 260-65. But cf Anne Case et al., Household Resource Allocation in Stepfamilies:
Darwin Reflects on the Plight of Cinderella, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.), May
1999, at 234, 237-38 (reporting evidence of disproportionate food expenditure on
biological versus adopted children). In five jurisdictions today, an adopted child can
inherit by intestacy from both the natural and adoptive family, irrespective of whether
the adoption was of the confidential variety. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2118 (1994); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7505-6.5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (construed in Stark v. Watson,
359 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1961)); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-7-16, -17 (2003); Tex. Prob.
Code Ann. § 40 (Vernon 2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107 (Michie 2003); see also
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-11-103(6), 15-11-114 (2002) (allowing an adopted child to
inherit by intestacy from a natural parent only if the natural parent has no other
heirs). In two other states, an adopted child can inherit by intestacy from the natural
family as well as the adoptive family if the decree of adoption so provides, a rule that
can take account of the type of adoption at issue. Alaska Stat. § 25.23.130(a)(1)
(Michie 2002); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) (West 1998). In Pennsylvania,
the statute specifies that an adopted child can inherit by intestacy from kindred of the
natural parents (although not the natural parents themselves) "who ha[ve]
maintained a family relationship with the adopted person," thereby taking account of
extrinsic evidence-a rule that could reasonably be extended to the natural parents as
well. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2108 (West 1975 & Supp. 2003). The drawback of this
rule is that the contingency of maintaining a "family relationship" is too subjective to
forestall litigation.
256. In addition, the Code carves out an exception from the general rule of
intestacy rights upon adoption that may at once be overbroad and underinclusive: If a
child is adopted by a spouse of a natural parent, the child is the heir of the adoptive
parent and can also continue to inherit by intestacy from or through either natural
parent. Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(b) (amended 2003); see also Restatement, supra
note 219, § 2.5(2)(C), cmt. h, statutory note 11, reporter's note 6. The rationale for
this exception is left unstated. See Unif, Probate Code § 2-114 cmt. (amended 2003);
id § 2-109 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 284-85 (1998) (pre-1990 version of article II). It presumably
rests on the assumption that in cases of stepparent adoption the child (obviously) will
still have a relationship with the custodial natural parent and is also likely to maintain
a relationship with the family of the noncustodial natural parent. Patricia G. Roberts,
Adopted and Nonmarital Children- Exploring the 1990 Code's Intestacy and Class
Gift Provisions, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 539, 543 (1998). This assumption is likely
to be sound in connection with a stepparent adoption following the death of a natural
parent, but possibly not in connection with a stepparent adoption following divorce of
the natural parents, both of whom must then consent to the adoption. If the
noncustodial parent grants consent, that action could indicate a break with the child.
See, e.g., Estate of Dye v. Battles, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 367-68, 370 (Ct. App. 2001)
(where such a break had occurred). Some state statutes distinguish between these
two scenarios, although the distinction still needs to be corroborated by empirical
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manifestly flawed: It applies irrespective of whether the child was
adopted as a minor, or as an adult. 7 Adult adoption is today widely
permissible and generally requires no consent or even notification of
the natural family. The only social connection implied by the act
involves the adoptor and adoptee. Other members of the "adoptive"
family are as unlikely to develop bonds of affection with the adult
adoptee as members of the natural family are to sever theirs.
Empirical evidence will surely confirm that a separate rule of intestacy
covering adult adoption would better serve to effectuate probable
intent. Indeed, in this context, even the Commissioners' social-policy
rationale for the existing rule fails to apply.2 8 As of now, however,
only two jurisdictions distinguish minor from adult adoption under
their intestacy laws.259
evidence. Roberts, supra, at 543 n.11. The Code also neglects to extend its exception
to adoption following the deaths of both natural parents, which under most
circumstances seems unlikely to sever ties between the adopted child and the families
of either natural parent (although again this inference requires empirical
confirmation). For statutory references and discussion, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
121(e) (2001); Restatement, supra note 219, § 2.5(2)(B) & cmts. f-g, statutory notes 9-
10, reporter's note 5; Roberts, supra, at 553-55. Finally, under the Code the exception
does not operate reciprocally: Only the adoptive parent and the natural parent who is
married to the adoptive parent, and their kindred, not the other natural parent and
his/her kindred, can ever inherit by intestacy from the adopted child. Unif. Probate
Code § 2-114(b) (amended 2003). Because bonds of affection tend naturally to be
mutual, this element of the exception appears dubious as an intent-effectuating
measure. See Mikulincer et al., supra note 240. By comparison, some state statutes
featuring similar exceptions do create reciprocal rights of intestate succession. E.g.,
Fla. Stat. ch. 732.108(1)(b)-(c) (2003).
257. See supra note 251; see also Tinney v. Tinney, 799 A.2d 235, 236-38 (R.I. 2002).
258. See supra note 252. Empirical study of the phenomenon of adult adoption
should further distinguish adult adoption of stepchildren from others. On the
problem of unadopted stepchildren, see infra notes 260-63. For a discussion of adult
adoption and its treatment under intestacy statutes, see Jan E. Rein, Relatives by
Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of
Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and
Class Gifts), 37 Vand. L. Rev. 711, 749-57 (1984). Professor Rein identified the
inadequacy of the Code in this regard, id. at 755 n.182, but once again the
Commissioners turned a blind eye to the criticism. See also Brashier, supra note 12, at
160-63; Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
1996 Utah L. Rev. 93, 162-72, 176-77.
259. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 14-1-101(2), 15-11-114(2) (2002) (providing that minor
adoptees become heirs of the adoptive parents and their kindred, and vice versa, but
not heirs of the natural parents and their kindred, and vice versa; whereas, adult
adoptees remain heirs of the natural parents and their kindred, and vice versa, and
also become heirs of the adoptive parents but not their kindred); N.J. Stat Ann. §§
2A:22-3, 3B:5-9, 9:3-50 (West 2002) (providing that minor adoptees become heirs of
the adoptive parents and their kindred, and vice versa, but not heirs of the natural
parents and their kindred, and vice versa; whereas, adult adoptees remain heirs of the
natural parents and their kindred, and that adult adoptees also become heirs of the
adoptive parents but not their kindred, and that adoptive parents and their kindred
become the heirs of the adult adoptee); see Ehrenclou v. MacDonald, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d
411, 417-19 (Ct. App. 2004) (dicta, construing Colorado law); see also MacCallum, 686
A.2d at 941 (observing that intestate succession by an adult and minor adoptee raise
distinct issues of public policy); cf Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 107.15(A)(3) (Anderson
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If the rules of intestacy applicable to an adopted person warrant
review, so do those applying to unadopted family members-that is,
the benefactor's stepchildren. These currently enjoy no right of
intestate succession under the Code, as under the vast majority of
state statutes.26  If, however, stepchildren joined the benefactor's
household and were raised by the benefactor, the possibility remains
that he or she would perceive them as indistinguishable from a natural
(or adopted) child.26' Once again, an empirical study could isolate
more precisely the social circumstances under which intent to benefit
a stepchild at death is not merely possible but probable.262 Still and
all, unless those variables are defined objectively within an intestacy
statute, applying them could embroil heirs in costly litigation.263
2003) (excluding adult adoptees from bequests by virtue of lapse, as well as from class
gifts, but not explicitly covering adult adoptees' intestacy rights); Unif. Probate Code
§ 2-705(c) & cmt. (amended 2003) (construing class gifts to exclude adult adoptees
when the grantor is someone other than the adoptive parent, on the basis of inferred
intent).
260. Restatement, supra note 219, § 2.5(3) & cmt. f; Unif. Probate Code §§ 1-
201(5), (9), (33), 2-103(1) (amended 2003); cf infra note 262 (remarking exceptional
state statutes).
261. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250, 255 (Ct. App. 1992)
(involving children who believed their stepmother was their natural mother). For
sociological discussions, see for example, Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman,
Remarried Family Relationships 69-86 (1994) (surveying studies of variables that
affect the quality of a stepparent/stepchild relationship); Susan J. Gamache,
Confronting Nuclear Family Bias in Stepfamily Research, in Stepfamilies: History,
Research and Policy 41, 51-56 (Irene Levin & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Stepfamilies] (same).
262. Existing empirical evidence supports the proposition that some fraction less
than a majority of stepparents consider their stepchildren as equivalent to their
natural children for purposes of inheritance. Sussman et al., supra note 28, at 108-13;
Kim Porter, The Will of the Wealthy, Tr. & Est., Aug. 1999, at 56, 56. Accordingly, a
default rule of intestate succession for stepchildren would require refinement. See
Estate of Cleveland v. Thomas, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 599 (Ct. App. 1993) (drawing the
inference that "intestates ... are unlikely to have wished to provide equally for their
natural and adopted children on the one hand and their voluntarily unadopted
stepchildren... on the other"); Finch et al., supra note 72, at 101-03 (reporting results
of a British study); Case et al., supra note 255, at 237-38 (reporting evidence of
disproportionately small food expenditure on stepchildren versus biological or
adopted children); Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Attitudes Toward
Inheritance Following Divorce and Remarriage, 19 J. Fam. & Econ. Issues 289, 308-09,
310-13 (1998) (reporting survey evidence); cf. Cal. Prob. Code § 6454 (Deering Supp.
2004) (allowing a stepchild to inherit as an heir if (1) the relationship of stepparent
and stepchild began when the child was a minor, (2) continued throughout their joint
lives, and (3) the stepparent would have adopted the child but for a legal barrier).
For criticisms of this statute, suggesting it is too restrictive, see Gary, Parent-Child,
supra note 12, at 671-74; Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate
Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 929-31 (1989). Intestacy statutes in a
few other jurisdictions allow stepchildren, and sometimes other affines, to take as
heirs in the absence of a surviving spouse and any heirs of the blood. Restatement,
supra note 219, § 2.4 statutory notes 4a-b, 5b, 6.
263. See supra Part I.D.l.a. For two thoughtful proposals to create intestacy rights
in stepchildren, premised on whether the court finds a parent-child relationship to
have existed between the decedent and a stepchild, see Gary, Adapting Intestacy,
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A similar concern for social facts might improve the default rules of
inheritance among siblings. As presently configured, the Code and
most state statutes treat whole- and half-blooded siblings alike for
purposes of intestate succession.2 6 On the other hand, stepsiblings
never comprise heirs unless they become related by adoption.265
Neither the Commissioners' official nor unofficial commentary
contains a word about these rules, so their rationale remains a
mystery.266 Contemplated from the perspective of probable intent, we
can hypothesize that the typical benefactor would not distinguish
whole-blooded siblings from either half-blooded or stepsiblings, so
long as they grew up together within the same household. If,
however, either half-blooded or stepsiblings were brought up in
separate households, then we would expect the typical benefactor to
form closer bonds with whole-blooded siblings.267 Lawmakers could
supra note 12, at 71-82; and Mahoney, supra note 262, at 928-40. Professor Gary's
proposal is marginally more concrete than Professor Mahoney's, in that it specifies an
array of factors (structurally reminiscent of the badges of fraud) as "indications" of
that relationship, but without making any one or more of them determinative. See
Gary, Adapting Intestacy, supra note 12, at 81. Hence, under both proposals, courts
would exercise discretion, a prospect that we earlier questioned theoretically. See
supra Part I.D.l.c. One court has even warned that such an approach could have
deleterious social consequences. See Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 362
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) ("[lIt is in the public interest for stepparents to be generous and
loving with their stepchildren. Such conduct could be discouraged if a consequence of
such kindness toward a stepchild would be the imposition on the stepparent of the
legal incidents of parenthood .... ). The alternative approach is to create a fixed
default rule of stepchild inheritance if objective factors are present, where empirical
evidence demonstrates those factors to be associated in a majority of cases with the
presence of donative intent.
264. Unif. Probate Code § 2-107 (amended 2003) (no comment accompanies this
provision); see also Restatement, supra note 219, § 2.4 cmt. f, statutory note 7
(remarking some statutory variation among the states).
265. Unif. Probate Code §§ 1-201(33), 2-103(3) (amended 2003).
266. See supra note 264. One commentator has defended the Code's rule on the
social basis that "[ellimination of distinctions between half blood and whole blood
relatives has a beneficial effect in that it may reduce tensions within the family."
Kossow, supra note 12, at 248. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such a
policy should supersede intent, it takes no account of the problem of stepsiblings.
267. Sociological evidence supports this donative hypothesis:
Half-siblings who live together all or most of the time generally think of each
other simply as siblings. The "half" is a meaningless abstraction.... When
children have little contact, however, distinctions between half-siblings and
full siblings are more common; in these situations the "sibling" part of the
label "half-sibling" is the meaningless abstraction.
Ganong & Coleman, supra note 261, at 104 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence H.
Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, Do Mutual Children Cement Bonds in Stepfamilies?, 50
J. Marriage & Fam. 687 (1988); cf Lynn K. White & Agnes Riedmann, When the
Brady Bunch Grows Up: Step/Half- and Fuilsibling Relationships in Adulthood, 54 J.
Marriage & Fam. 197 (1992) (finding that half- and stepsibling relationships tend to
continue into adulthood, but that whole-blooded sibling relationships tend to be
closer). See generally Anne C. Bernstein, Stepfamilies from Siblings' Perspective, in
Stepfamilies, supra note 261, at 153. That the degree of positive feelings between
persons is a function of the frequency of their interaction is an old and fundamental
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formulate a default rule premised on this contingency, although it
would again call for objective definition.268 Once more, the matter
warrants empirical investigation. 69
A final social fact disregarded by the Code, along with most state
statutes, is committed sexual partnership outside of marriage. A
number of proposals have been made in recent years, both within and
without the National Conference of Commissioners, to recognize
these partnerships, involving either opposite-sex or same-sex couples,
for purposes of intestate succession. 270 Two studies already provide
empirical ammunition for such a rule within a probable-intent
model,27 1 and one of those has even begun to explore statistically the
indicia of commitment likely to trigger donative intent.
proposition of sociology. See, e.g., George C. Homans, The Human Group 110-17
(1950); Robert H. Frank, Cooperation Through Emotional Commitment, in Evolution
and the Capacity for Commitment 57, 67-69 (Randolph M. Nesse ed., 2001). Within
popular culture, the theorem finds expression in a maxim: "to know me is to love
me." But for a contrary hypothesis that benefactors will typically prefer whole-
blooded siblings to others, see Atkinson, supra note 7, at 197-202; Beckstrom, supra
note 225, at 258-60; and for an early discussion, see Bentham, supra note 138, at 335-
36.
268. See supra Part I.D.l.a. The Code already incorporates such a contingency in
its provision construing class gifts, albeit one that may lack optimal clarity. See Unif.
Probate Code § 2-705(b) (amended 2003) (construing class gifts to children of a third
party to include only those children who "lived while a minor as a regular member of
the household" of the third party or a close relative).
269. Query also whether the typical decedent would prefer a twin sibling over other
siblings. Sets of twins often form a unique emotional bond, and sometime even
develop a private language (called an idioglossia) during childhood. See Ricardo C.
Ainslie, The Psychology of Twinship 138-47 (1997); Barbara Schave & Janet Ciriello,
Identity and Intimacy in Twins 105-11 (1983); A.O. Scott, The Secret Languages of
Childhood, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2003, at 15. A sociobiologist might predict that
identical twins, as genetic alter egos, would wish to bequeath twice as much to each
other as to other siblings, with whom they share half as much genetic information. See
Beckstrom, supra note 225, at 258-60 (discussing the problem of half-blooded versus
whole-blooded siblings). This matter also ought to be studied empirically.
270. Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 24-31, 63-65, 92-95; Spitko, supra note 12, at
264-68, 289-349; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59
Mo. L. Rev. 21, 78-87 (1994). Thus far, four jurisdictions have enacted statutes on
point. Cal. Fam. Code § 297 (Deering Supp. 2004); Cal. Prob. Code §§ 37, 6401
(Deering Supp. 2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 560:2-102, 572C-4, 572C-5 (Michie
1999); 2004 Me. Legis. Serv. 672 (West); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(b) (2002) (by
implication). But cf. 2003 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 246 (West) (creating a domestic
partner law that fails to include rights to intestate inheritance).
271. Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 35-52, 89; Johnson & Robbennolt, supra note
49, at 490-96. For an anecdotal illustration, see for example Holtz v. Deisz, 68 P.3d
828, 829-30, 834 (Mont. 2003) (construing a holographic will that bequeathed "the
bulk of [testator's] estate" to his nonmarital companion).
272. Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 52-65. Once again, those indicia require
objective definition to avoid breeding costly litigation. See Brashier, supra note 12, at
52-54; Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 26. Requiring committed partners to register
for the status is one possible solution to the objectivity problem. For a discussion, see
T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex
Equality, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1513, 1525-28 (1999). All of the existing state statutes take
this approach. See supra note 270.
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Having zeroed in on the problem of commitment beyond marriage,
scholars have overlooked a less fashionable but nonetheless
significant set of issues concerning the edges of marriage. For
purposes of intestate succession, the legal dividing line between
bachelorhood and marriage, and between marriage and divorce, are
the formal proceedings themselves.273 Universally taken for granted,
these traditional boundaries of affinity may have an implicit social-
policy foundation in the context of inheritance defaults. Whether they
correspond with probable intent remains a question that no one has
thought to raise, let alone investigate. Do couples that have
announced their engagement to be married typically wish to bequeath
to one another? Do spouses who have permanently separated or filed
for divorce typically wish to do so?74 Effectuation of probable intent
might well require lawmakers to acknowledge that subjective affinity,
pertinent to the formulation of default rules, begins-and ends-in
anticipation of its mandatory legal ramifications.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to rescue the problem of inheritance
defaults from splendid isolation. Although not without distinctive
features, the problem remains closely akin to that of contractual
defaults; many of the axioms worked out within the contracts field
easily cross the category barrier, enabling us to administer a dose of
analytical rigor to defaulttheorizing within the inheritance field. Just
as majoritarian defaults display the virtues of efficiency on the
273. See Estate of Carlisle v. Hundoble, 653 N.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Iowa 2002)
(holding that a decree of separate maintenance does not operate to terminate marital
inheritance rights); Unif. Probate Code § 2-802 & cmt. (amended 2003).
274. For one probate judge's plea for a provision denying intestacy rights to
spouses who have lived apart for "somewhere in the range of three to five years" in
order to carry out their respective "presumed intent," see Estate of Carmona, N.Y.
L.J., May 12, 2000, at 30. In some instances, separation agreements that precede
divorce explicitly provide for the loss of inheritance rights, by intestacy or otherwise.
See, e.g., Gustason v. Dean, 250 P.2d 837, 838-39 (Kan. 1952) (giving effect to such a
settlement agreement to override the intestacy statute); see also Estate of Lahey v.
Bianchi, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 32-34 (Ct. App. 1999) (applying a statute denying
intestacy rights to a surviving spouse following a court order terminating all marital
property rights). In a few states, a spouse who abandons the other spouse forfeits the
right to inherit as an heir, but these statutes once again comprise social defaults
premised on wrongdoing and hence do not operate reciprocally: The abandoned
spouse remains the heir of the abandoning spouse unless the abandoned spouse as
well commits "misconduct." In re Archer's Estate, 70 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1950); see
Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-2-14 (Michie 2000); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-1.2(5)
(McKinney 1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-1 (2003); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2106
(West 1975 & Supp. 2003); Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-16.3 (Michie 2002); Estate of Fulton,
619 A.2d 280, 285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Estate of Carmona, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2000,
at 30. Where intent to disinherit a spouse is probable, lawmakers might nevertheless
mandate a minimum "forced share" in intestacy, equivalent to the forced share a
surviving spouse disinherited under a will can claim (and invariably smaller than a full
intestate share). Cf. Browder, supra note 31, at 1313.
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contractual side, so do they share the same virtues on the donative
side. Meanwhile, we have endeavored to see clearly-and through-
some of the inheritance scholars' more misty notions, including
expressivism. One can only hope this "ism" becomes a "wasm" in
short order.275
Why have inheritance scholars been more open to social
considerations than contract scholars in their respective approaches to
the formulation of default rules? More generally, why have the
contract scholars' trove of insights concerning this generic problem
received so little comparative attention?
Part of the answer may have to do with the relatively greater
poignancy of social considerations on the inheritance side, magnifying
their capacity to cloud analytical judgment. Implicating as they do
family relations and situations that we can all imagine, if not relate to,
inheritance policies carry an emotional resonance that more abstract
questions about contractual fairness lack. It requires a somewhat
austere turn of mind to recognize that the injection of social
considerations-the injustice of abandonment for example-into
inheritance defaults will produce inefficiency and discriminate
between differently-situated benefactors.
But there is more going on here than just that. At the outset of this
Article, we speculated that scholars' failure to conceptualize the array
of inheritance defaults as a singular issue had obscured the potential
relevance of default rule theory, which sprang from such an analytical
consolidation in the field of contracts. In a sense, though, this
explanation begs the question: Why had inheritance theorists not
watched this consolidation occur and pondered it by analogy? In part,
their very segregation within a distinct legal category has operated to
restrict inheritance scholars' peripheral vision. Although useful in
some respects, legal categorization has a perverse and pervasive
tendency to confine theory. The ensuing "cross-sterilization of
disciplines," as Felix Frankfurter put it, affects all corners of the legal
landscape, and the inheritance field, with its barriers and hedges, is no
exception.276
Yet, theoretical confinement is only the half of it. Because they are
contingent, legal categories may also be roped off arbitrarily, for
reasons that often have (as Justice Holmes would say) more to do
with history than with logic.27 7 Inheritance law has long been viewed
as adjacent to, or even as a sub-category of, property law. To offer
just one example, the American Law Institute chose to address the
doctrines of inheritance within its Restatement of Property -thereby
275. To borrow a historian's bon mot. John Lukacs, The Stirrings of History,
Harper's Mag., Aug. 1990, at 41 (ascribing the phrase to an unidentified "English
wit").
276. Quoted in David Spiegel, Peer Review, The Sci., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 16, 19.
277. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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locating them intellectually within that category. 78 In the process, the
conceptual space between inheritance law and contract law has
expanded, rendering it a less obvious-and hence a neglected-
repository of ideas for inheritance scholars.
Considered logically, however, both domains involve transfers of
assets between parties, albeit transfers distinguished by that elusive
but oh-so-important abstraction, the presence (or absence) of
consideration. From the perspective of public policy, these fields are
in fact nearly connected.179  The ready adaptability of contractual
default rule theory to inheritance defaults both reflects and illustrates
the nearness of that connection. And it is a connection whose utility
we have not begun to exhaust. °
Thus, the epilogue of our story provides a prologue for others: In
all its aspects, inheritance law will benefit from reexamination through
the lens of contractarianism.
278. 1 Page, supra note 59, § 1.1, at 1 ("The law of wills., is clearly a part of the
law of property."). The Restators were not, however, entirely oblivious to the
subject's contractual nexus. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative Transfers,
at Introduction (1983) ("This part of the Restatement . .. excludes. . . commercial
transactions in property, even though some of the property problems dealt with
herein may arise in a commercial context as well as in a donative one.").
279. But for a recent discussion defending the conceptual and policy distinction
between the two spheres, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the
World of Gift, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 821, 840-52 (1997). Cf Avner Offer, Between the Gift
and the Market: The Economy of Regard, 50 Econ. Hist. Rev. 450 (1997).
280. Professor John Langbein has already urged that trust law be conceptualized as
a branch of contract law (i.e., a third-party beneficiary contract). Langbein, supra note
6. Cf. Melanie B. Leslie, Morals or Markets? Monitoring Trustee Misbehavior (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The
Function of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 434, 469-72 (1998); Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 627-34.
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APPENDIX I
In order to model the possible utility of a social default, assume that
there are two alternative rules, Rp being the rule all parties prefer,
and Rs being the socially beneficial rule. These rules can take the
form either of a mandatory rule (MRs) or a default rule (DRs or
DRp). Now let n = the number of parties (being individual
benefactors or pairs of contracting parties in hypothetical agreement),
let c = the transaction cost of overriding a default rule, let Vs = the
value to society of Rs per party who conforms to it (assumed to be
constant, irrespective of which parties decide to conform), and let Vn
= the value to a given party of implementing the preferred rule (said
value varying from party to party, but assuming further that the value
of Rs is zero to all parties). The set of every Vn will now break down
into two subsets, Vca and VB, where Va = the (varying) value to a
given party of implementing Rp and for whom Va - c > 0, hence who
would incur a transaction cost to override a DRs, and where Vf5 = the
(varying) value to a given party of implementing Rp and for whom VB
- c < 0, hence who would not incur a transaction cost to override a
DRs.
The total value of implementing MRs = n(Vs).
The total value of implementing DRp = Y Va + Y VB
The total value of implementing DRs = Y Va - a(c) + B(Vs)
MRs is optimal if it produces more total value than either DRp or
DRs. This is true where n(Vs) > Y Va + Y_ VB which simplifies to:
Vs> Vn
and where n(Vs) > E Va - a(c) + B(Vs) which simplifies to:
Vs > Va - c
DRp is optimal if it produces more total value than either MRs or
DRs. This is true where Y_ Va + Y_ VB > n(Vs) which simplifies to:
Vs < Vn
and where Y Va + Y V8 > Y Va - a(c) + B(Vs) which simplifies to:




DRs is optimal if it produces more total value than either MRs or
DRp. This is true where Y Va - a(c) + B(Vs) > n(Vs) which simplifies
to:
Vs < Va - c
and where , Va - a(c) + B(Vs) > Y Va + E VB which simplifies to:
Vs>VB+a}
B
or, in combination, where
VB + al < Vs < Va - c
B
Professor Ayres and a collaborator make a related point that
implicitly assumes the potential efficiency of social defaults.
Intriguing, they argue that lawmakers can potentially increase
efficiency by artificially raising transaction costs, in order to create the
conditions under which sorting will occur. 81 Such manipulation would
be relatively easy to achieve in the inheritance realm, for example, by
abolishing low-cost holographic wills in jurisdictions that currently
permit them.
Professor Ayres's insight can be proven mathematically. Return to
our model, and assume initially that Vn - c > 0 for all parties, so that
all have a sufficient incentive to opt out of a social default. Then,
The total value of implementing MRs = n(Vs)
The total value of implementing DRp = Vn
The total value of implementing DRs = Vn - n(c)
Under these conditions, MRs is optimal where n(Vs) > Y_ Vn, and
DRp is optimal where Y Vn > n(Vs). DRs is never optimal.
Now assume that n(Vs) > Y_ Vn, so that MRs is optimal. If c
becomes a variable, we can contrive to increase c to a level where
some parties (a) will continue to have a sufficient incentive to opt out
of a social default, but others (n - a) no longer will.
For what values of c is n(Vs) < E Va - a(c) + (n - a)Vs?
Where: c < Va - Vs. So long as we do not increase c above this
amount, and then switch from MRs to DRs, we increase total wealth.
Now assume instead initially that E Vn > n(Vs) so that DRp is
optimal. Once again, if we increase c and thus trigger sorting, for
what value of c is Y Vn < Y Va - a(c) + (n - a)Vs?
281. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 123-25.
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Where: c < Va + (n-a)Vs - Y Vn
a a
So long as we do not increase c above this amount, and then switch
from DRp to DRs, we increase total wealth.
Notice finally that a (and hence Va) is itself a function of c.
Consequently, as c increases Va may also increase! We thus observe
that there exist, so to say, different sorts of sorts. But the ideal value
of c, yielding the ideal sort, will depend on the varying distributions of
Va's and hence cannot be assayed under this model.
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APPENDIX II
In order to model the optimal complexity of an inheritance default,
assume that the rule concerns an issue that different parties value at a
varying level (V), that overriding the rule will entail a one-time
transaction cost (c), and that the information cost of learning the rule
(i) produces a probability (p), expressed as a fraction between 0 and 1,
that the default rule corresponds with different parties' preferences.
If we can assume that legal complexity enhances p as it raises i-in
other words, that lawmakers are sound craftsmen-then p is a
function of i and approaches I as i increases.
If for all parties i < c < V, and if all parties are perfectly risk averse,
then all parties will pay the information cost necessary to learn the
rule. All parties will then proceed either to rely on the default rule (if
it fits their preference) or to opt out (if it doesn't). The average value
of the rule thus equals:
p(V - i) + (1 - p)(V - i - c)
which reduces to:
V - i- c + p(c)
V (in any one scenario) and c are fixed. Accordingly, we maximize
the average value of the rule at the point where we maximize p(c) - i
The level of complexity at which p(c) - i reaches its maximum
obviously varies, depending upon the function of p and i. We can,
however, determine that the rule becomes optimally complex at some
level below the point at which i grows so large that i = c, because at
that point p(c) - i _< 0.
Notice finally that our universe of parties could include those who
devalue the issue resolved by the default rule to the extent that for
them V < c. These parties will never opt out of the rule and
accordingly have no incentive to spend i to learn the rule. So far as
they are concerned, the more complex-and hence accurate-the
rule, the better off they are, so long as V > 0. The more numerous
they are, the more total value (albeit the sum of small values) they will
derive from an extremely complex rule. These are parties whose
characteristics are such that, for them, default rule theory has broken
down. From their perspective, the default rule is functionally
equivalent to a mandatory rule. If these parties predominated, and if
a social default would yield greater value per party than their
preferred default, then lawmakers would enhance total wealth by
imposing the social default. If, however, we assume that effectuating
these parties' preference would produce greater value than a social
default, then we maximize total wealth by establishing a more
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complex rule than otherwise, depending on how many such parties
exist relative to the number of parties for whom V > c.
Assume Va > c for parties a whereas VB < c for parties B. The total
value derived from the default rule is now
a[p(Va - i) + (1 - p) (Va - i - c] + B(pVB)
which reduces to
a[Va + p(c)- i- c] + B(pVB)
A default rule is optimally complex where p and i are such that the
value of this equation reaches its maximum.
Specifically in the context of inheritance defaults, however, we may
be able to disregard all parties B, in which event an inheritance default
is optimally complex when p(c) - i reaches its maximum, via our
previous formula. The reason is simple: Parties for whom V < c have
no incentive to pay i in order to learn the rule. If no freeriding occurs,
so that all (or at least most) parties B never learn the rule that
lawmakers might complexify in order to reflect their preferences more
accurately, then they derive no value from it because they die before it
takes effect. The value to any party from an inheritance default flows
from the anticipation282 of knowing how it will operate postmortem.
Parties who remain ignorant of the rule accordingly derive no value
from it and lawmakers should ignore their preferences.
282. Value from anticipation is sometimes called savoring. Jon Elster & George
Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipation, in Choice over Time 213, 224
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
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